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3I. Introduction and Historical Context
Every student of the law knows that changed circumstances are a ground for 
overruling precedents and repealing statutes. For example, Justice Cardozo, in rewriting 
product liability law stated, “Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do 
not fit the conditions of travel today. The principle that the danger must be imminent does 
not change, but the things subject to the principle do change. They are whatever the needs 
of life in a developing civilization require them to be.”3 Similarly, the United States 
Supreme Court in the Admiralty context, when rejecting the traditional common law 
triple duty standard for owners and occupiers of land, stated:
The distinctions which the common law draws between licensee and 
invitee were inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land, a culture 
which traced many of its standards to a heritage of feudalism. In an effort 
to do justice in an industrialized urban society, with its complex economic 
and individual relationships, modern common-law courts have found it 
necessary to formulate increasingly subtle verbal refinements, to create 
subclassifications among traditional common-law categories, and to 
delineate fine gradations in the standards of care which the landowner 
owes to each. Yet even within a single jurisdiction, the classifications and 
subclassifications bred by the common law have produced confusion and 
conflict. As new distinctions have been spawned, older ones have become 
obscured. Through this semantic morass the common law has moved, 
unevenly and with hesitation, towards “imposing on owners and occupiers 
a single duty of reasonable care in all circumstances.”4
Sometimes, new laws are necessary because we used to live differently than we 
do now. Laws appropriate to feudal times are in apropos in modern civilization. On other 
________________________________________________________________________
3 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E 1050 (1916).
4 Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale, 358 U.S. 625, 630–631, 79 S.Ct. 406, 410, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 
(footnotes omitted); see also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697.
4occasions, our lifestyle has not changed but our beliefs about the world—both its physical 
properties and the psychology or biology of humans—have changed. Although this 
Article focuses mostly on changes in scientific beliefs, changed circumstances are also 
relevant to our main thesis. 
We have seen that laws and judicial decisions may, in retrospect, no longer be 
useful, or may even prove to have been mistaken when they were created. They are, at 
most, based upon some subset of the sum total of information available at the time the 
laws and decisions are created. That information itself is always incomplete, and 
sometimes mistaken. When knowledge advances, it is wise and necessary to reconsider 
legislation, regulation, and common law decisions that were based upon prior views. 
This is especially true for laws governing medicine, a field that has changed, and is 
continuing to change, rapidly and profoundly as science advances.
A. Common Law Overrulings and Statutory Changes Resulting from Medical 
Advances 
Many medical advances have spawned overrulings of traditional doctrine. For 
example, since the thirteenth century, there has been a common law principle that 
originated in England, stating that an act causing death is not a homicide if the death 
occurs more than a year and a day after the act was committed.5 This so-called year and a 
day rule has been understood as a substantive principle of criminal law, conclusively 
presuming that an injury inflicted more than a year and a day before the victim dies does 
________________________________________________________________________
5 United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C.1987); State v. Ruesga, 619 N.W.2d 377, 380 
(Iowa 2000); People v. Stevenson, 416 Mich. 383, 331 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1982); State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 
613, 403 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1991); State v. Picotte, 661 N.W.2d. 381, 385 (Wis. 2003).
5not cause the death, with the result that the injurer is not guilty of homicide.6 However, 
with modern technology, it is now possible to keep some brain-damaged individuals alive 
for many years after an assault, thus turning the assault into a homicide years later. In 
State v. Picotte, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, writing for the Wisconsin supreme 
court, stated that one of the traditional justifications for the rule was that the primitive 
state of thirteenth-century medical knowledge had made it difficult to establish causation 
beyond a reasonable doubt after a great deal of time had elapsed between the injury to the 
victim and the victim’s death.7 However, the court continued, “advances in medical 
science that permit causes of death to be identified with great certainty have undermined 
[this] justification.”8 For these and other reasons, courts in at least a dozen states have 
abrogated the year and a day rule as anachronistic, based primarily on advances in 
medical science.9 It is likely that most—if not all—jurisdictions that consider the rule in 
the future will abrogate it as well.
Similarly, advances in medical science have changed our understanding of death 
from primarily cessation of heart, circulatory, and respiratory function to cessation of 
________________________________________________________________________
6 Picotte, 661 N.W.2d at 385. 
7 Picotte, 661 N.W.2d at 390.
8 Id.
9 In Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the Tennessee’s 
judicial abrogation of the year and a day rule was not a violation of the Due Process Clause. The Court 
reasoned that every court to have recently considered the year and a day rule had pointed to advances in 
medical science and related science as undermining the usefulness of the rule. Id. at 461. In State of Iowa v. 
Ruesga, 619 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa 2000), the court noted that ten courts had abrogated the year and a day 
rule. Although the court did acknowledge that the rule had been legislatively abrogated in 1860, the court 
largely relied on advancements in medical science as support for concluding that the year and a day rule 
was no longer a valid defense. Id. at 380.
In New Mexico (State v. Gabehart, 836 P.2d 102, 103 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992)), the New Mexico 
Court of Appeals considered whether courts or legislatures should abolish the year and a day rule. The 
court found that courts have the power to judicially abrogate common-law doctrines that “have proven 
anachronistic.” Id. The court relied on advances in medical and criminal science as illustrating that the year 
and a day rule was anachronistic. Id.
In North Carolina (State v. Hefler, 299 S.E. 2d 456 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)), the court denied the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the common law year and a day rule. The court stated that the 
“advances in medical science and improvement of diagnostic skills relative to the prolongation of human 
life obviate the need for (the year and a day) rule.” Id. at 459.
6brain and nervous system function. Because killing is causing death, this change is the 
basis for the demise of the year and a day rule. The Connecticut supreme court provides a 
list of considerations that courts should consider in determining whether advancements in 
medical science justify overruling prior common law rules.10 These factors include:11
1) Whether the issue has ever been raised before; in this case, it counts in favor 
of seriously considering switching to brain death that this is an issue of first 
impression;
2) The valuable quality of common law as active and dynamic, and changing to 
meet the needs of a growing society;
3) The absurdity of a prohibition against taking into account new medical 
equipment that can more accurately diagnose and determine medical facts;
4) The policy of courts not to ignore change or disregard reality;
5) That reasonable evolving medical standards should play a dominant role in 
relevant legal rules in the absence of overriding contrary considerations;
6) The plain meaning doctrine; 
7) Plain meaning should be enlarged or narrowed, as appropriate, under changed 
circumstances;
8) Statutory construction is not “a ritual to be observed by unimaginative 
adherence to well-worn professional phrases,” quoting Justice Frankfurter;12
________________________________________________________________________
10 State v. Guess, 244 A.2d 643, 649 (Conn. 1998).
11 Id.
12 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflexions on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Columbia.L.Rev. 527, 529 
(1947).
79) The doctrine that the common law may look to the policies underlying 
statutes.13
Much legislation is passed as a result of changed circumstances. Some of that 
legislation is responsive to scientific advances. For example, many states have adopted 
legislation redefining death as cessation of brain function.14
B. Medical Advances and Legal Theory
There are two major kinds of theories of law, natural law and legal positivism. 
Natural law asserts the existence of some necessary or constitutive relationship between 
law and critical morality, that is, moral propositions whose truth is independent of the 
beliefs of society or its conventions: some would call it absolute morality. By contrast, 
legal positivism maintains that there is no necessary connection between law and 
morality; any connection is merely contingent. Law is a matter of social fact. 
We will briefly describe how changed circumstances, especially scientific 
advances, are dealt with by one of each kind of theory. Michael Moore, a natural law 
theorist, urges that the term ‘death’ is a natural kind term, like ‘cow,’ ‘lithium,’ or ‘gold.’ 
By contrast, ‘pencil’ and ‘store’ are not natural kinds but artificial constructs whose 
meaning depends upon human purpose and usages. One major theory of the reference, 
semantics, or meaning of such terms is that their meaning is determined by scientific 
investigation. Moore accepts this theory of language in general and applies it to legal 
________________________________________________________________________
13 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
14 The Uniform Determination of Death Act (1980).
8language in particular. Cows, lithium, and gold are whatever science discovers them to 
be.15 Thus, cows are whatever are four-legged mammals with udders, that moo, and so 
on. Similarly, lithium is the lightest metal, with atomic number 3, a melting point of 
180.5 degrees centigrade, and a boiling point of 1342 degrees centigrade. It is a 
monovalent cation that belongs to the group of alkali metals together with sodium, 
potassium and other elements with which it shares some of its properties. Lithium can 
replace sodium in extracellular fluid and during the process of depolarization it has an 
extremely rapid intracellular influx and so on. 
The reference of the term ‘death’ in particular is one that it is the job of science, 
especially medical science, to discover. Moore therefore supports the movement by 
courts to overturn common law definitions of death as cessation of heart, lung, 
circulatory functions, and consciousness by cessation of brain function when scientists 
tell us that cessation of brain function is a more accurate definition of death.16
The legal positivist Melvin Eisenberg develops his theory of law as a coherent 
reconstruction of social morality, policy, and experiential propositions.17 Experiential 
propositions are propositions “about the way world works.”18 Among experiential 
propositions that play a role in adjudication are “the laws of the physical and biological 
sciences.”19 Experiential propositions, including especially laws of psychology, mediate 
between policies, principles and doctrinal rules.20 Eisenberg is careful to note that courts 
can make mistakes about scientific and other propositions about the world. When other 
________________________________________________________________________
15 SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1973); Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of ‘Meaning’, in 
COLLECTED PAPERS, vol. 3 (1981).
16 Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 293–94, 
322–28(1985).
17 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988).
18 Id. at 37.
19 Id. at 38.
20 Id at 39.
9courts and the larger discourse about such propositions raise questions about their 
validity, courts must pull back and either revise the rule or explain why the criticism is 
not founded. One source of such criticism is law review articles.21 It is our purpose in 
writing this Article to stimulate courts into reconsidering doctrine that is based upon 
beliefs about mental illness that are now outdated.
C. A Brief Historical Context of Mental Health Law
This Article describes advances in our scientific understanding of severe 
psychiatric disorders and evaluates the implications of these advances for laws governing 
involuntary hospitalization and treatment. Civil commitment, a more familiar term for 
involuntary hospitalization, is perhaps the most controversial area of mental health law. 
This Article illuminates this area by analyzing the underlying medical facts, legal 
policies, and moral principles. As such, it throws light on an area of law that has been, 
and continues to be, controversial.
Beginning in the 1960s, virtually all states undertook major changes in their 
mental health laws. These changes have had a profound effect on the practice of 
psychiatry and on psychiatric services. For example, in 1955, there were 559,000 
individuals hospitalized in state psychiatric hospitals in the United States. Based on the 
increase in the general population since that time, if a comparable per population number 
of individuals were similarly hospitalized today, they would number approximately one 
million. In fact, there are fewer than 50,000 individuals so hospitalized, meaning that 
95% of individuals who would have been hospitalized fifty years ago have been 
________________________________________________________________________
21 Id at 41–42.
10
effectively deinstitutionalized.22 Changes in state mental health laws and judicial 
decisions beginning in the late 1960s played a major role in promoting this 
deinstitutionalization.
It is generally accepted that the outcome of deinstitutionalization has not been as 
favorable as had been originally hoped. Many would say that it has been a dismal failure. 
The number of homeless individuals with severe psychiatric disorders has risen steadily 
in recent decades, and they now constitute at least one-third of all homeless individuals.23
A relationship between deinstitutionalization and homelessness has been clearly 
established.24 Hallucinating men and women are now standard urban fixtures on the 
sidewalks of American cities and mid-sized towns.
The number of severely psychiatrically ill individuals in America’s jails and 
prison has also risen steadily, with estimates of their total ranging from 7% to 16% of all 
those incarcerated.25 The majority of these individuals have been charged with 
misdemeanor crimes, often directly related to behavior attributable to their psychiatric 
disorder. Often, individuals discharged from state psychiatric hospitals end up in jail 
________________________________________________________________________
22 E. Fuller Torrey, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 
(1997) (hereinafter TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS). 
23 Estimates of the total number of homeless persons in the United States have varied widely, but 
multiple studies have reported that at least one-third of them have a serious psychiatric disorder, 
predominantly schizophrenia or bipolar disorder. See, for example, TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS, 17, for 
a review.
24 Studies of psychiatric patients discharged from state hospitals in Massachusetts, Ohio, and New 
York found that between 27% and 38% of the patients became homeless within six months of discharge. 
See Robert E. Drake et al., Housing Instability and Homelessness among Aftercare Patients of an Urban 
State Hospital, 40 HOSP. COMM. PSYCHIATRY 46 (1989); John R. Belcher, Rights versus Needs of 
Homeless Mentally Ill Persons, 33 SOCIAL WORK 398 (1988); John R. Belcher, Defining the Service Needs 
of Homeless Mentally Ill Persons, 39 HOSP. COMM. PSYCHIATRY 1203 (1988); Malcolm Gladwell, 
Backlash of the Benevolent, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 22, 1995, at A1, A18.
25 The percentage of inmates reported as having psychiatric disorders has varied in different surveys 
depending on how “psychiatric disorders” was defined. In the most publicized study, released by the U.S. 
Department of Justice in 1999, it was estimated that 16% of individuals incarcerated in American jails and 
prisons had a severe psychiatric disorder. Since there are over two million individuals incarcerated, this 
would suggest that approximately 320,000 of them have a severe psychiatric disorder. See Paula M. Ditton, 
MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special 
Report, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (1999).
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within months of being discharged.26 It has also been alleged that individuals with severe 
psychiatric disorders, especially those who are not receiving treatment, are responsible 
for an increasing number of violent acts, including homicides.27
D. A Brief Description of Parts II–VI
Part II of this Article describes scientific advances in understanding severe 
psychiatric disorders that have occurred since 1975. Severe psychiatric disorders 
primarily include the diagnoses of schizophrenia, bipolar (manic-depressive) disorder, 
and major depression with or without psychotic features. We focus on schizophrenia, 
rather than discussing all severe mental illnesses, in order to keep the presentation to a 
manageable length.
Part III describes recent advances in understanding anosognosia and its 
application to severe psychiatric disorders. Although anosognosia is one aspect of the 
broader scientific advances described in Part II, because of its importance, it is crucial for 
understanding mental health laws and thus deserves its own section.
________________________________________________________________________
26 For example, a study of patients discharged from Ohio’s Columbus State Hospital reported that 
32% of those diagnosed with schizophrenia had been arrested and jailed within six months. These 
individuals were arrested because of being “threatening in their behaviors” and exhibiting bizarre behaviors 
“such as walking in the community without clothes and talking to themselves.” See John R. Belcher, Are 
Jails Replacing the Mental Health System for the Homeless Mentally Ill? 24 COMMUNITY MENT. HEALTH J. 
185 (1988).
27 A 1988 U.S. Department of Justice study reported that individuals with a history of psychiatric 
illness, not including drug or alcohol abuse, were responsible for 4.3% of all homicides in the United 
States; see John M. Dawson and Patrick A. Langan, MURDER IN FAMILIES, Bureau of Statistics Special 
Report, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (1988). A study 
published by the National Institute of Mental Health reported that “the SPMI (severe and persistently 
mentally ill) population without substance(abuse)-related disorders may be responsible for no more than 
about 3 percent of violent crime, with 3 to 5 times as much violence accounted for by the dually diagnosed 
(SPMI and substance disorders) population.” See Henrick Harwood et al., THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF 
MENTAL ILLNESS, 1992, 1.5 (2000).
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Parts IV and V analyze two of the most important state mental health laws that 
were changed in the late 1960s and early 1970s: the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, enacted 
in California in 1969, and the Lessard v. Schmidt decision, handed down by a three-judge 
District Court in Wisconsin in 1972. In both instances, the assumptions made at the time 
the laws were changed regarding the nature of severe psychiatric disorders and the 
competence of individuals to make informed treatment decisions are now known to be 
erroneous.
Part VI then examines the legal implications of current scientific knowledge for 
the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and the Lessard decision as representative examples of 
state mental health laws. The implications can perhaps best be summarized in the words 
of Bertolt Brecht: “Intelligence is not to make no mistakes / But quickly to see how to 
make them good.”28
II. Understanding the Causes of Schizophrenia
A. Before 1975: A Scientific Muddle
During the 1960s and early 1970s, when state laws governing involuntary 
commitment and treatment of psychiatric patients were undergoing revision in many 
states, the causes of schizophrenia were essentially unknown. There was, in fact, 
controversy regarding whether schizophrenia was even a disease entity. The American 
Handbook of Psychiatry, published in 1959, was probably the most influential psychiatric 
________________________________________________________________________
28 Bertolt Brecht, THE MEASURE TAKEN 3 (1930).
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textbook of the 1960s. Its two chapters on schizophrenia approvingly quoted Thomas 
Szasz’s early writings: “The problem of schizophrenia which many consider to be the 
core problem of psychiatry today. . . . To put it simply: there is no such problem.”29 This 
was written even prior to Szasz’s 1961 book The Myth of Mental Illness, which widely 
popularized the idea that schizophrenia did not exist.
Insofar as schizophrenia did exist, the American Handbook of Psychiatry leaned 
heavily toward psychoanalytic explanations that were fashionable at that time. The 
textbook defined schizophrenia as “a specific reaction to an extreme state of anxiety, 
originated in childhood and reactivated later in life by psychological factors,”30 and it 
devoted 75% of the two chapters on schizophrenia to various psychoanalytic 
explanations. Specifically, the textbook claimed: “Psychodynamic studies reveal that the 
road leading to schizophrenia had its beginning in the remote past of the patient, perhaps 
shortly after his birth.”31
In addition to psychoanalytic explanations for the cause of schizophrenia, 
psychiatric textbooks of this era also focused on the family, and specifically mothers, as 
________________________________________________________________________
29 Silvano Arieti, Schizophrenia: Other Aspects; Psychotherapy, (hereinafter ARIETI, 
SCHIZOPHRENIA: OTHER ASPECTS), in S. Arieti (ed.), AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, VOL. 1, 501 
(1959) (hereinafter ARIETI, AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, VOL. 1). Szasz has continued making 
similar statements for over forty years in the lay press and in books such as THE MANUFACTURE OF 
MADNESS, (1970) and SCHIZOPHRENIA: THE SACRED SYMBOL OF PSYCHIATRY (1976). Szasz’s writings 
were very influential among lawyers who litigated most of the psychiatric court cases in the 1960s and 
1970s. For example, Bruce Ennis, who has been called “the ‘father’ of the mental health bar” and who 
subsequently became chairman of the American Bar Association’s Commission on the Mentally Disabled, 
said that he initially became interested in legal issues regarding the mentally ill when: “I went to a library 
and I looked under ‘law and psychiatry’ and found some books by a man named Thomas Szasz which I 
found interesting from a civil liberties perspective and I read more and I realized this was a very, very big 
problem about which most people, including myself, knew nothing”; see Rael Jean Isaac and Virginia C. 
Armat, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: HOW PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL 109–
110 (1990). When Ennis published his influential PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY in 1972, Szasz contributed a 
preface.
30 ARIETI, AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, VOL. 1, 501.
31 Silvano Arieti, Schizophrenia: The Manifest Symptomatology, the Psychodynamic and Formal 
Mechanisms (hereinafter ARIETI, SCHIZOPHRENIA: THE MANIFEST SYMPTOMATOLOGY), in ARIETI, 
AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, VOL. 1, 468.
14
the cause of the disorder. The American Handbook of Psychiatry, for example, 
prominently featured the theories of Theodore Lidz and his colleagues at Yale University, 
who had studied families with one member affected with schizophrenia. It summarized 
these theories as follows:
Many authorities consider the mother the main dynamic factor in the 
genesis of the child’s future psychiatric condition, and have devised the 
classification ‘schizophrenogenic mother.’ She has been described in 
many ways: overprotective, hostile, overtly or subtly rejecting, 
overanxious, cold, and distant etc. In many cases she is found definitely 
unfit for motherhood.32
Szaszian, psychoanalytic, and family interaction theories continued to dominate 
professional thinking about the causes of schizophrenia throughout the 1960s and early 
1970s, as measured by two other leading textbooks of psychiatry. The Theory and 
Practice of Psychiatry was published in 1966, and Modern Synopsis of Comprehensive 
Textbook of Psychiatry in 197233; one book or the other was used by virtually every 
trainee in psychiatry, psychology, and psychiatric social work of that period.
In its chapter on schizophrenia, The Theory and Practice of Psychiatry picked up 
the Szaszian theme widely circulating at that time and asked: “Is it [schizophrenia] a 
disease? A maladjustment? A way of life?” Regarding possible causes of schizophrenia, 
the textbook acknowledged that “no satisfactory general etiological explanation exists at 
________________________________________________________________________
32 ARIETI, SCHIZOPHRENIA: THE MANIFEST SYMPTOMATOLOGY, 469. Although such theories sound 
outlandish today, in the 1960s they were considered to be mainstream and were accepted by the majority of 
psychiatrists.
33 Frederick C. Redlich & Daniel X. Freedman, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY (1966) 
(hereinafter REDLICH & FREEDMAN, THEORY AND PRACTICE) and Alfred M. Freedman et al., MODERN 
SYNOPSIS OF COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY (1972) (hereinafter FREEDMAN ET AL., MODERN 
SYNOPSIS). 
15
present. . . . [O]ur knowledge represents more of a speculative game than an opportunity 
to assess an array of well-verified facts. . . . In a word, we are still groping in darkness.”34
In discussing possible theories regarding the cause of schizophrenia, The Theory 
and Practice of Psychiatry devoted the majority of its discussion to psychoanalytic and 
family interaction theorists. Regarding the former, the textbook noted that psychoanalytic 
investigators assumed that factors predisposing to schizophrenia could be found in 
traumatic events in early childhood and that most utterances and behavior of individuals 
with schizophrenia are psychologically meaningful and represent repressed wishes of the 
individual.35
Family interaction theories of schizophrenia were also given prominence in 
The Theory and Practice of Psychiatry. The 1950s research of Theodore Lidz, cited in 
The American Handbook of Psychiatry, had been supplemented by the mid-1960s by the 
studies of several other researchers, especially Don D. Jackson and Gregory Bateson in 
California. Jackson and Bateson attributed the cause of schizophrenia to faulty 
communications between parent (especially mother) and child, which they claimed 
produced confusion and ultimately the symptoms of schizophrenia in the developing 
child.36 These family theories were prominently cited by individuals who were trying to 
change state mental health laws, as will be discussed in section IV.
________________________________________________________________________
34 REDLICH & FREEDMAN, THEORY AND PRACTICE 459, 506, 486–87.
35 REDLICH & FREEDMAN, THEORY AND PRACTICE 500. As an example, the textbook cites the 
following: “A schizophrenic patient fell from a third-story window when he tried to launch a contraption 
that would permit him to fly to the sun. Like his famous model, Icarus, he failed. Is the patient’s behavior 
more meaningful if we consider that he wanted to be close to his father and also compete with him? We 
believe it is.” (496)
36 Specifically, Jackson and Bateson claimed that parents may produce schizophrenia in a child by 
using communications that put the child in a “double-bind.” An example cited by The Theory and Practice 
of Psychiatry is as follows: “A mother gives her son two neckties for Christmas and when the boy appears 
wearing one, she asks disapprovingly, ‘Didn’t you like the other one?’ Here the boy cannot in sanity wear 
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Modern Synopsis of Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry, published in 1972, 
enumerated seven possible causal explanations of schizophrenia. Three of the six theories 
attributed schizophrenia to stress, another to “severe psychological trauma” early in life, 
another to “family environment and its interacting members,” and the last to a mix of all 
of these.37 Overall in this textbook, two-thirds of the discussion on possible causes of 
schizophrenia focused on psychological causes. Family interaction theories were 
especially prominent and emphasized “the concept that the patient is a symptom of the 
family pathology and that serious mental disturbances are causally related to mental 
disease or psychopathology in parents.”38
Prior to 1975, possible biological causes of schizophrenia were also considered 
but not given prominence in textbooks of psychiatry. For example, the American 
Handbook of Psychiatry devoted 25% of its two chapters on schizophrenia to biological 
theories but largely relegated them to the past. “An enormous number of studies have 
been made in an attempt to determine the organic changes that cause, accompany, or are 
the result of schizophrenia. Their findings are not consistent, their interpretation 
controversial.”39 Specifically discussed were genetic studies, “constitutional factors,” “the 
endocrine glands,” biochemical changes, and neuropathology. The biochemical 
investigations were said to be “almost entirely negative” and neuropathological studies of 
the brain to have “not revealed anything more definite than have the other organs.”40
both, and if he wears either or none he will displease his mother.” (REDLICH & FREEDMAN, THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 503).
37 FREEDMAN ET AL., MODERN SYNOPSIS 222.
38 FREEDMAN ET AL., MODERN SYNOPSIS 224.
39 ARIETI, SCHIZOPHRENIA: THE MANIFEST SYMPTOMATOLOGY, 485.
40 ARIETI, SCHIZOPHRENIA: THE MANIFEST SYMPTOMATOLOGY, 487, 488.
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In fact, if one examines early biological studies of schizophrenia with the benefit 
of hindsight, they anticipate successful biological studies that have been carried out since 
1975. Studies of brain structure were done by pneumoencephalography, which involved 
injecting air into the brain’s fluid-filled spaces (cerebral ventricles) and then taking X-
rays. Five studies of individuals with schizophrenia were carried out prior to the 
introduction of antipsychotic medications; all showed enlargement of the cerebral 
ventricles in the patients,41 a finding that has been replicated many times in more recent 
studies.
Another common method for measuring biological abnormalities in individuals 
with schizophrenia in these early studies was done by electroencephalogram [EEG] 
Between 1941 and 1955, five controlled EEG studies of never-medicated patients with 
schizophrenia were carried out; all five reported that approximately twice as many 
patients as normal controls had abnormal EEGs.42 This is consistent with findings in 
recent studies.
A variety of neurological abnormalities were also described in patients with 
schizophrenia prior to the introduction of antipsychotic medication. Abnormal 
involuntary movements called dyskinesias were widely observed more than a century 
________________________________________________________________________
41 W. Jacobi & H. Winkler, Encephalographische Studien auf Chronischen Schizophrenen, 81 
ARCHIV FÜR PSYCHIATRIE UND NERVENKRANKHEITEN 299 (1927); M. Moore et al., Encephalographic 
Studies in Schizophrenia (Dementia Praecox), 89 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 801 (1933); R. Lemke, 
Untersuchungen über die Soziale Prognose der Schizophrenia unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung des 
Encephalographischen Befundes, 104 ARCH. PSYCHIAT. NERVENKR. 89 (1935); J.F. Donovan et al., Some 
Observations on Leucotomy and Investigations by Pneumoencephalography, 95 J. MENT. SCI. 655 (1949); 
G. Huber, PNEUMOENCEPHALOGRAPHISCHE UND PSYCHOPATHOLOGISCHE BILDER BEI ENDOGENEN 
PSYCHOSEN (1957).
42 K.H. Finley & C.M. Campbell, Electroencephalography in Schizophrenia, 98 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
374 (1941); M. Greenblatt, M., Age and Electroencephalographic Abnormality in Neuropsychiatric 
Patients: A Study of 1593 Cases, 101 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 82 (1944); G.H.A. Chamberlain & J.G. Russell, 
The E.E.G.S of the Relatives of Schizophrenics, 98 J. MENT. SCI. 654 (1952); D. Hill, EEG in Episodic 
Psychotic and Psychopathic Behaviour: A Classification of Data, 4 EEG CLIN. NEUROPHYSIOL. 419 
(1952); and R.J. Ellingson, The Incidence of EEG Abnormality among Patients with Mental Disorders of 
Apparently Nonorganic Origin: A Critical Review, 111 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 263 (1954).
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ago. A review of the clinical records of over 600 patients in an English asylum between 
1850 and 1890, for example, found descriptions of dyskinesias for almost one-third of the 
patients.43 Similarly, rigidity, tremor, and a slowing of physical movements were 
frequently described in the early years of the twentieth century as neurological signs of 
schizophrenia.44 Studies were also done on individuals with schizophrenia, demonstrating 
abnormalities in vestibular reactivity, which is the brain’s mechanism that controls the 
person’s sense of motion.45
In summary, in the United States prior to 1975, our understanding of the causes of 
schizophrenia was a muddle. One group of psychiatric professionals denied that the 
disease even existed. Among those who believed schizophrenia did exist, the majority 
believed that it was caused by traumatic experiences in early childhood and/or by faulty 
parenting and communications. A minority of psychiatric professionals believed that 
schizophrenia was a biological disease of the brain, but this theory was widely considered 
to be a relic of the past. Anyone who was considering changing mental health laws at that 
time would have been likely to conclude, after examining the existing professional 
literature, that the best scientific view was that schizophrenia was a psychological 
condition brought about by early childhood experiences and maladaptive parenting, not 
an organic disease of the brain. As we demonstrate in sections IV and V, that is what 
happened. 
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43 T. Turner, Rich and Mad in Victorian England, 19 PSYCHOL. MED. 29 (1989). For a summary of 
such studies, see E. Fuller Torrey, Studies of Individuals with Schizophrenia Never Treated with 
Antipsychotic Medications: A Review, 58 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 101 (2002).
44 See, for example, E. Kraepelin, DEMENTIA PRAECOX AND PARAPHRENIA 34 (1919), and P.J. 
Reiter, Extrapyramidal Motor-Disturbances in Dementia Praecox, 1 ACTA PSYCHIATR. NEUROL. SCAND.
287 (1926).
45 A. Angyal & N. Blackman, Vestibular Reactivity in Schizophrenia, 44 ARCH. NEUROL. 
PSYCHIATRY 611 (1940); Andras Angyal & Max A. Sherman, Postural Reactions to Vestibular Stimulation 
in Schizophrenic and Normal Subjects, 98 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 857 (1942); and Gerald Fitzgerald & E. 
Stengel, Vestibular Reactivity to Caloric Stimulation in Schizophrenics, 91 J. MENT. SCI. 93 (1945).
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B. Since 1975: A Biological Disease
Our understanding of the causes of schizophrenia has changed profoundly since 
1975. Prior to that time, researchers were “groping in the darkness,” in the words of one 
psychiatric textbook. Since 1975, literally hundreds of studies have been carried out 
proving beyond any reasonable doubt that schizophrenia is a disease of the brain. 
Although the precise cause of the disease is still being elucidated, among professionals, 
the consensus is virtually unanimous that schizophrenia is a brain disease. In this respect, 
schizophrenia is now thought to be similar to Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, 
multiple sclerosis, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, and other disorders that are known to be 
diseases of the brain but whose precise causes are not yet known.
One way to compare pre-1975 views of psychiatry with contemporary views is by 
comparing standard textbooks of psychiatry. For example, the 7th edition of the 
Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry, published in 2000, is a direct descendent of the 
first edition, published in 1972, as discussed above. In the 1972 edition, prior to the 
recent studies, 75% of the discussion of the causes of schizophrenia was allotted to 
psychological causes and 25% to biological causes. Moreover, most of the discussion of 
psychological theories of schizophrenia is from a historical point of view. In the 2000 
edition, only 10% of the discussion of the causes of schizophrenia is allotted to 
psychological causes, with the remaining 90% allotted to biological causes.46 Moreover, 
in the American Psychia tric Press Textbook of Psychiatry, published in 1999, “social and 
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46 Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, 7TH ED. 
(2000). 
20
family factors” regarding the causes of schizophrenia occupy only 6% of the text on this 
subject, while biological factors are discussed in the remaining 94%.47 These textbooks 
reflect the important change in our understanding of schizophrenia that has taken place 
since 1975.
The remainder of this section will summarize studies that lead to the conclusion 
that schizophrenia has biological roots and is a disease of the brain. We will restrict the 
discussion to studies that have been carried out on individuals who had never been treated 
with antipsychotic medication; such individuals are frequently referred to as “neuroleptic 
naïve.” There are two reasons for confining discussion to this group. First, antipsychotic 
medications themselves may also bring about biological changes in the brain; in fact, that 
is why such medications are effective in treating the symptoms of schizophrenia. Thus, by 
restricting the analysis to untreated patients, it becomes clear that whatever abnormalities 
are found are a consequence of the schizophrenia disease process and not due to 
medications. Second, some authors who oppose psychiatry have argued that 
schizophrenia is a consequence of medication, not a naturally occurring phenomenon. 
They have therefore concluded that modern psychiatric medications do more harm than 
good.48
Studies of individuals with schizophrenia who had never been treated with 
antipsychotic medications at the time the studies were done can be divided into structural 
abnormalities, neurological abnormalities, neuropsychological abnormalities, 
neurophysiological abnormalities, and cerebral metabolic abnormalities.
________________________________________________________________________
47 Robert E. Hales et al. (eds.), THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PRESS TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, 3RD 
ED. (1999).
48 Peter R. Breggin, TOXIC PSYCHIATRY (1991); Robert Whitaker, MAD IN AMERICA (2003).
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1. Structural Abnormalities
The modern era in schizophrenia research can be dated to 1976 with the 
publication of the first research using the newly developed computerized axial 
tomography (CT) brain scans, which showed that the brains of individuals with 
schizophrenia have significantly larger fluid-filled spaces (cerebral ventricles) compared 
to normal controls. The CT scan was the first technology allowing for visualization of 
brain structures in living patients that could be used to statistically distinguish those with 
schizophrenia from normal controls.49 Following the introduction of CT scans, magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) scans have also become widely available for studying brain 
structures.
Since 1976, a total of thirty-three studies of brain structure have been done on 
individuals with schizophrenia who had never been medicated.50 All six studies that 
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49 Eve C. Johnstone et al., Cerebral Ventricular Size and Cognitive Impairment in Chronic 
Schizophrenia, 2 LANCET 924 (1976). This research was carried out at Northwick Park Clinical Research 
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ventricular size between individual patients with schizophrenia and normal controls, and so ventricular size 
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50 S.C. Schulz et al., Treatment Response and Ventricular Brain Enlargement in Young 
Schizophrenic Patients, 19 PSYCHOPHARMACOL. BULL. 510–12 (1983); G. Degreef et al. Increased 
Prevalence of the Cavum Septum Pellucidum in Magnetic Resonance Scans and Post-Mortem Brains of 
Schizophrenic Patients, 45 PSYCHIATRY RES.: NEUROIMAGING 1–13 (1992); J. Lieberman et al., 
Qualitative Assessment of Brain Morphology in Acute and Chronic Schizophrenia, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
784–94 (1992); M.H. Chakos et al., Increase in Caudate Nuclei Volumes of First-Episode Schizophrenic 
Patients Taking Antipsychotic Drugs, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1430–36 (1994); R.E. Gur et al., Subcortical 
MRI Volumes in Neuroleptic-Naïve and Treated Patients with Schizophrenia, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1711–17 (1998); M.S. Keshavan et al., Decreased Caudate Volume in Neuroleptic-Naïve Psychotic 
Patients, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 774–78 (1998); L. Shihabuddin et al., Dorsal Striatal Size, Shape, and 
Metabolic Rate in Never-Medicated and Previously Medicated Schizophrenics Performing a Verbal 
Learning Task, 55 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 235–43 (1998); P.W. Corson et al., Caudate Size in First-
Episode Neuroleptic-Naïve Schizophrenic Patients Measured Using an Artificial Neural Network, 46 BIOL. 
PSYCHIATRY 712–20 (1999); R.E. Gur et al., Reduced Gray Matter Volume in Schizophrenia, 56 ARCH. 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 905–11 (1999); R.E. Gur et al., Reduced Dorsal and Orbital Prefrontal Gray Matter 
Volumes in Schizophrenia, 57 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 761–68 (2000); R.E. Gur et al., Temporolimbic 
Volume Reductions in Schizophrenia, 57 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 769–75 (2000); U. Ettinger et al., 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Thalamus in First-Episode Psychosis, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 116–18 
(2001); A.R. Gilbert et al., Thalamic Volumes in Patients with First-Episode Schizophrenia, 158 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 618–24 (2001); W. Cahn et al., Brain Morphology in Antipsychotic-Naïve Schizophrenia: A 
Study of Multiple Brain Structures, 181 (suppl 43) BR. J. PSYCHIATRY S66–72 (2002); W. Cahn et al., 
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measured the size of the brain ventricles found them to be significantly enlarged. For 
example, Gur et al. reported a 16% increase in ventricular volume in thirty-three never-
treated patients compared to sixty-five normal controls. Similarly, McCreadie et al. 
reported a 20% increase in ventricular volume in forty-two patients compared to thirty-
one normal controls. In addition to ventricular size, abnormalities in brain structure in 
never-treated individuals with schizophrenia have been reported for the frontal cortex, 
temporal cortex, hippocampus, amygdala, cingulate, thalamus, cerebellum, corpus 
callosum, and septum pellucidum. The only brain area that has been extensively studied 
Brain Volume Changes in First-Episode Schizophrenia: A 1-Year Follow-up Study, 59 ARCH. GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 1002–10 (2002); H. Gunduz et al., Basal Ganglia Volumes in First-Episode Schizophrenia 
and Healthy Comparison Subjects, 51 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 801–808 (2002); C.C. Joyal et al., A Volumetric 
MRI Study of the Entorhinal Cortex in First Episode Neuroleptic-Naïve Schizophrenia, 51 BIOL. 
PSYCHIATRY 1005–1007 (2002); P. Karlsson et al., PET Study of D1 Dopamine Receptor Binding in 
Neuroleptic-Naïve Patients with Schizophrenia, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 761–67 (2002); M.S. Keshavan et 
al., Abnormalities of the Corpus Callosum in First Episode, Treatment Naïve Schizophrenia 72 J. NEUROL. 
NEUROSURG. PSYCHIATRY 757–60 (2002); M.S. Keshavan et al., Cavum Septi Pellucidi in First-Episode 
Patients and Young Relatives at Risk for Schizophrenia, 7 CNS SPECTRUMS 155–58 (2002); R.G. 
McCreadie et al., Structural Brain Differences between Never-Treated Patients with Schizophrenia, with 
and without Dyskinesia, and Normal Control Subjects: A Magnetic Imaging Study, 59 ARCH. GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 332–36 (2002); S. Tauscher-Wisniewski et al., Caudate Volume Changes in First Episode 
Psychosis Parallel the Effects of Normal Aging: A 5-Year Follow-Up Study, 58 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 185–88 
(2002); G. Cherascu et al., Changes in Morphology of the Thalamus over Time in Subjects with Neuroleptic 
Naïve Schizophrenia: Effects of Neuroleptic Treatment (abstract), 60 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 191 (2003); M. M. 
Haznedar et al., Cingulate Gyrus Gray and White Matter Volumes in Drug Naïve Schizophrenia Patients
(poster presentation), annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association (May 2003); M. M. 
Haznedar et al., Hippocampus Volume and 3-D Metabolic Mapping in Drug-Naïve Schizophrenia Patients
(poster presentation), annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association (May 2003); J. Hietala et al., 
Regional Brain Morphology and Duration of Illness in Never-Medicated First-Episode Patients with 
Schizophrenia (letter), 64 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 79–81 (2003); C.C. Joyal et al., The Amygdala and 
Schizophrenia: A Volumetric Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study in First-Episode Neuroleptic-Naïve 
Patients, 54 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 1302–1304 (2003); J.-J. Kim et al., Morphology of the Lateral Superior 
Temporal Gyrus in Neuroleptic Naïve Patients with Schizophrenia: Relationship to Symptoms, 60 
SCHIZOPHR. RES. 173–81 (2003); A.L.T. Lacerda et al., Orbitofrontal Cortex in First-Episode 
Schizophrenia: An MRI Study (abstract), 53 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 116S (2003); P.R. Szeszko et al., Smaller 
Anterior Hippocampal Formation Volume in Antipsychotic-Naïve Patients with First-Episode 
Schizophrenia, 160 A M. J. PSYCHIATRY 2190–97 (2003); G. Venkatasubramanian et al., Corticocerebellar 
Alterations in Never-Treated Young Age at Onset Schizophrenia (abstract), 60 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 211 
(2003); M. Konasale et al., Cerebellum Morphometry in First-Episode Psychotic Disorders: Regional 
Specificity for Psychotic Symptoms and Cognition (abstract), 55 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 169S (2004); G. 
Venkatasubramanian et al., Longitudinal Study of MRI Gray Matter Volume in Treatment-Naïve 
Schizophrenia: Evidence for Cognitive Dysmetria (abstract), 67 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 25 (2004).
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and for which the results of different studies have been contradictory is the basal ganglia, 
especially its caudate subdivision.
2. Neurological Abnormalities
Since 1976, at least thirty-three studies have reported significantly more 
neurological abnormalities in individuals with schizophrenia who had never been treated 
with antipsychotic medications compared to unaffected controls. The neurological 
abnormalities include abnormal spontaneous movements called dyskinesias, parkinsonian 
signs, neurological soft signs, and cerebellar signs.
Dyskinesias are spontaneous movements, usually involving the tongue, facial 
muscles, or arms. Eleven studies have demonstrated that such movements occur more 
often among never-treated individuals with schizophrenia than among normal controls.51
For example, Fenton et al. found that 23% of never-treated patients exhibited some form 
of spontaneous dyskinesia. Seven recent studies have also reported that never-treated 
patients with schizophrenia have neurological abnormalities resembling those seen in 
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51 D.G.C. Owens, Spontaneous Involuntary Disorders of Movement, 39 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 
452–61 (1982); D. Rogers, The Motor Disorders of Severe Psychiatric Illness: A Conflict of Paradigms,
147 BR. J. PSYCHIATRY 221–32 (1985); R.G. McCreadie et al., The Scottish First Episode Schizophrenia 
Study: I. Patient Identification and Categorisation, 150 BR. J. PSYCHIATRY 331–33 (1987); J.L. 
Waddington & H.A. Youssef, The Lifetime Outcome and Involuntary Movements of Schizophrenia Never 
Treated with Neuroleptic Drugs: Four Rare Cases in Ireland, 156 BR. J. PSYCHIATRY 106–108 (1990); W. 
Fenton et al., Risk Factors for Spontaneous Dyskinesia in Schizophrenia, 51 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 
643–50 (1994); A. Chatterjee et al., Prevalence and Clinical Correlates of Extrapyramidal Signs and 
Spontaneous Dyskinesia in Never-Medicated Schizophrenic Patients, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1724–29 
(1995) (hereinafter CHATTERJEE ET AL., PREVALENCE AND CLINICAL CORRELATES); D.S. Fenn et al., 
Movements in Never-Medicated Schizophrenics: A Preliminary Study, 123 P SYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 206–
10 (1996); R.G. McCreadie et al., Abnormal Movements in Never-Medicated Indian Patients with 
Schizophrenia, 168 B R. J. PSYCHIATRY 221–26 (1996) (hereinafter MCCREADIE ET AL., ABNORMAL 
MOVEMENTS); M. Gervin et al., Spontaneous Abnormal Involuntary Movements in First-Episode 
Schizophrenia and Schizophreniform Disorder: Baseline Rate in a Group of Patients from an Irish 
Catchment Area, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1202–1206 (1998); B.K. Puri et al., Spontaneous Dyskinesia in 
First Episode Schizophrenia, 66 J. NEUROL. NEUROSURG. PSYCHIATRY 76–78 (1999) (hereinafter PURI ET 
AL., SPONTANEOUS DYSKINESIA); W. Honer et al., Are Movement Disorders a Part of the Syndrome or 
Consequences of Treatment? (abstract), 53 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 11 (2002).
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Parkinson’s disease, including rigidity, tremor, and slowing of movements.52 Combining 
the studies, 91 out of 394 (23%) never-treated patients showed parkinsonian signs.
Neurological abnormalities called soft signs have also been extensively 
investigated in individuals with schizophrenia. Soft signs include such things as being 
unable to identify the type of coin placed in the hand without looking at it. Since 1992, 
fourteen research groups have assessed the presence of neurological soft signs in never-
medicated patients with schizophrenia.53 Finally, a recent study compared neurological 
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52 M.P. Caligiuri et al., Parkinsonism in Neuroleptic-Naïve Schizophrenic Patients, 150 AM. J. 
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ET AL., ABNORMAL MOVEMENTS; L.C. Kopala et al., Risperidone in First-Episode Schizophrenia: 
Improvement in Symptoms and Pre-Existing Extrapyramidal Signs, 2 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
PSYCHIATRY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE S19–S25 (1998); PURI ET AL., SPONTANEOUS DYSKINESIA; W.G. Honer 
et al., Are Movement Disorders a Part of the Syndrome or Consequences of Treatment? (abstract), 53 
SCHIZOPHR. RES. 11 (2002); and L. Cortese et al., Motor Abnormalities and Clinical Correlates in Drug-
Naïve, First Episode Patients with Schizophrenia (abstract), 53 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 55 (2002).
53 J. Schröder, J. et al., Neurological Soft Signs in Schizophrenia 6 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 25–30 (1992); 
P. Rubin, P. et al., Neurological Abnormalities in Patients with Schizophrenia or Schizophreniform 
Disorder at First Admission to Hospital: Correlations with Computerized Tomography and Regional 
Cerebral Blood Flow Findings 90 ACTA PSYCHIATR. SCAND. 385–90 (1994); R.D. Sanders et al. 
Neurological Examination Abnormalities in Neuroleptic-Naïve Patients with First-Break Schizophrenia: 
Preliminary Results 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1231–33 (1994); S. Gupta et al., Neurological Soft Signs in 
Neuroleptic-Naïve and Neuroleptic-Treated Schizophrenic Patients and in Normal Comparison Subjects
152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 191–96 (1995); L. Flyct et al., Neurological Signs and Psychomotor Performance 
in Patients with Schizophrenia, Their Relatives and Healthy Controls, 86 PSYCHIATRY RES. 113–29 (1999); 
S. Browne et al., Determinants of Neurological Dysfunction in First Episode Schizophrenia 30 PSYCHOL. 
MED. 1433–41 (2000); M.-O. Krebs et al., Validation and Factorial Structure of a Standardized 
Neurological Examination Assessing Neurological Soft Signs in Schizophrenia 45 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 245–60 
(2000); M.-O. Krebs et al., Disorganisation Syndrome Is Correlated to Sensory Neurological Soft Signs in 
Medicated and Neuroleptic Naïve Schizophrenic Patients (abstract) 53 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 232 (2002); T. 
Shibre et al., Neurological Soft Signs (NSS) in 200 Treatment-Naïve Cases with Schizophrenia: A 
Community-Based Study in a Rural Setting 56 NORD. J. PSYCHIATRY 425–31 (2002); G. 
Venkatasubramanian et al., Neurological Soft Signs in Never-Treated Schizophrenia 108 ACTA PSYCHIATR. 
SCAND. 144–46 (2003); M.S. Keshavan et al., Diagnostic Specificity and Neuroanatomical Validity of 
Neurological Abnormalities in First-Episode Psychoses 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1298–1304 (2003); E.Y. 
Chen et al., Motor Soft Neurological Signs in First Episode Schizophrenia: A Two-Year Longitudinal Study 
(abstract) 60 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 129 (2003); P. Whitty et al., Prospective Evaluation of Neurological Soft 
Signs in First-Episode Schizophrenia in Relation to Psychopathology: State versus Trait Phenomena, 33 
PSYCHOL. MED. 1479–84 (2003); and Russell E. Scheffer, Abnormal Neurological Signs at the Onset of 
Psychosis (submitted for publication). Studies of neurological soft signs are especially useful in 
understanding the role of antipsychotic medications in schizophrenia. Studies done on patients with 
schizophrenia who were on and off medications at the time of testing suggest that the medications either 
have no effect on the presence of neurological soft signs or decrease such neurological findings. See T.C. 
Manschreck et al., Disturbed Voluntary Motor Activity in Schizophrenic Disorder 12 PSYCHOL. MED. 73–
84 (1982); T. Kolakowska et al., Schizophrenia with Good and Poor Outcome. III: Neurological ‘Soft’ 
Signs, Cognitive Impairment and Their Clinical Significance 146 BR. J. PSYCHIATRY 348–57 (1985); and 
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signs of cerebellar dysfunction in 155 never-treated individuals with schizophrenia to 155 
matched normal controls. Among the patients, 21% had signs of cerebellar dysfunction, 
such as having an abnormal gait, whereas only 5% of the normal controls had such 
abnormalities.54
3. Neuropsychological Abnormalities
For almost two centuries, it has been observed that individuals with schizophrenia 
have deficits in some neuropsychological functions, especially memory, attention, and 
planning (also called executive function). Since 1994, eight studies have been carried out 
on patients who had never received antipsychotic medications confirming these 
observations. For example, Brickman et al. compared twenty-nine never-medicated 
adolescents with schizophrenia to seventeen matched normal controls and reported that 
the patient group performed significantly worse than the normal controls, especially on 
memory, attention, and executive functioning.55 In addition to these eight studies, three 
other research groups studied individuals with first-episode schizophrenia, some of whom 
G. Goldstein & R.D. Sanders, The Effects of Antipsychotic Medication on Neurological Examination 
Abnormalities in Schizophrenia (abstract) 60 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 4 (2003).
54 B.-C. Ho, Cerebellar Dysfunction in Neuroleptic Naïve Schizophrenia Patients: Clinical, 
Cognitive, and Neuroanatomic Correlates of Cerebellar Neurologic Signs, 55 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 1146–53 
(2004).
55 See A.M. Brickman et al., Neuropsychological Functioning in First-Break, Never-Medicated 
Adolescents with Psychosis, J. NERV. MENT., in press. See also A.J. Saykin et al., Neuropsychological 
Deficits in Neuroleptic Naïve Patients with First-Episode Schizophrenia, 51 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY
124–31 (1994); R.G. McCreadie et al., Poor Memory, Negative Symptoms and Abnormal Movements in 
Never-Treated Indian Patients with Schizophrenia, 171 B R. J. PSYCHIATRY 360–63 (1997); I. Lussier & E. 
Stip, Memory and Attention Deficits in Drug Naïve Patients with Schizophrenia, 48 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 45–
55 (2001); D. Schuepbach et al., Selective Attention in Neuroleptic-Naïve First-Episode Schizophrenia: A 
Two-Year Follow-Up (abstract), 51 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 118S (2002); and J.G. Kerns et al., Context-
Processing Deficits and Decreased Prefrontal Cortex Activity: Specific Associations with Unmedicated, 
First-Episode Schizophrenia and with Disorganization Symptoms (abstract), 60 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 225
(2003); S.K. Hill et al. Impairment of Verbal Memory and Learning in Antipsychotic-Naïve Patients with 
First-Episode Schizophrenia, 68 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 127–36 (2004); K.P. Good et al., The Relationship of 
Neuropsychological Test Performance with the PANSS in Antipsychotic Naïve, First-Episode Psychosis 
Patients, 68 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 11–19 (2004).
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had never been medicated and some of whom had been briefly medicated, and reported 
that the never-medicated patients had significant neuropsychological deficits.56
4. Neurophysiological Abnormalities
Electrical impulses are one method used to communicate between brain cells. As 
noted previously, electroencephalograms (EEGs) have been used for many years to assess 
brain function in schizophrenia. Consistent with past studies, two recent studies used 
EEGs to examine sleep patterns in never-medicated individuals with schizophrenia, and 
both reported more abnormalities in the patients compared to the normal controls.57
Another technique commonly used in psychiatric research to measure 
neurophysiological function is a type of electrical impulse called an evoked potential, 
elicited by auditory, visual, or sensory input. For example, a startle reflex, measured 
electrically, may be evoked by a loud sound. Three recent studies of evoked potentials 
have been carried out on never-medicated individuals with schizophrenia; all three 
showed significantly more abnormalities in the patients than in normal controls.58
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54 (1999); and E.M. Riley et al., Neuropsychological Functioning in First-Episode Psychosis—Evidence of 
Specific Deficits, 43 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 47–55 (2000). There are recent studies that show that antipsychotic 
medications improve neuropsychological functioning; see, for example, R.S. Keefe et al., The Effects of 
Atypical Antipsychotic Drugs on Neurocognitive Impairment in Schizophrenia: A Review and Meta-
Analysis, 25 SCHIZOPHR. BULL. 201–22 (1999); H.Y. Meltzer & S.R. McGurk, The Effects of Clozapine, 
Risperidone, and Olanzapine on Cognitive Function in Schizophrenia, 25 SCHIZOPHR. BULL. 233–55 
(1999); and M.C.G. Merlo et al., Improvement of Cognitive Functions in Acute First-Episode Psychosis 
Treated with Risperidone (abstract), 53 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 27 (2002).
57 R. Ganguli et al., Electroencephalographic Sleep in Young, Never-Medicated Schizophrenics, 44 
ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 36–44 (1987) and Julie Poulin et al., Sleep Architecture and Its Clinical 
Correlates in First Episode and Neuroleptic-Naïve Patients with Schizophrenia, 62 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 147–
53 (2003).
58 Torben Mackeprang et al., Effects of Antipsychotics on Prepulse Inhibition of the Startle Response 
in Drug-Naïve Schizophrenic Patients, 52 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 863–73 (2002), and Katja Ludewig et al., 
Deficits in Prepulse Inhibition and Habituation in Never-Medicated, First-Episode Schizophrenia 54 BIOL. 
PSYCHIATRY 121–28 (2003). Another recent study included five patients who had never been medicated 
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Another measure of neurophysiological brain function is the recently developed 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), in which the brain is stimulated using magnets. 
A study of twenty-one neuroleptic-naïve individuals with schizophrenia reported them to 
be significantly different from twenty-one normal controls on some TMS measures.59
These studies suggest abnormal electrical and magnetic circuits in the brains of 
individuals with schizophrenia, evidence of neurophysiological dysfunction.
5. Cerebral Metabolic Abnormalities
The measurement of cerebral metabolic activity is comparatively new and 
technically complex. Three ways of doing this are by positron emission tomography 
(PET), single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI). Since it is known that antipsychotic medications can affect 
these tests,60 it is important to use individuals who have not been treated whenever 
possible.
Since 1991, twenty studies have examined cerebral metabolic abnormalities in 
individuals with schizophrenia never treated with antipsychotic medications. 
Representative of these studies is one by Braus et al., in which twelve never-medicated 
patients with schizophrenia were compared to eleven normal controls by functional MRI. 
According to the researchers: “In comparison with control subjects, patients showed 
and two others who had been off all medication for more than six months. It showed that antipsychotic 
medication improves neurophysiological function, as measured by the acoustic startle reflex; see Almut I. 
Weike et al., Effective Neuroleptic Medication Removes Prepulse Inhibition Deficits in Schizophrenia 
Patients, 47 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 61–70 (2000); M. Valkonen-Korhonen, Altered Auditory Processing in 
Acutely Psychotic Never-Medicated First-Episode Patients, 17 BRAIN RES. COGN. BRAIN RES. 747–58 
(2003).
59 P. Eichhammer et al., Cortical Excitability in Neuroleptic-Naïve First-Episode Schizophrenic 
Patients, 67 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 253–59 (2004).
60 R.T. Loeber et al., Cerebellar Blood Volume in Bipolar Patients Correlates with Medication, 51 
Biol. Psychiatry 370–76 (2002).
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reduced activation in the right thalamus, the right prefrontal cortex, and the parietal lobe 
. . . bilaterally.”61 Of the twenty studies reported to date, all except one found more 
cerebral metabolic abnormalities in the individuals with schizophrenia compared to the 
controls.
In summary, since 1975 at least 103 separate studies have demonstrated that 
individuals with schizophrenia, who have never been treated with antipsychotic 
medications, have significant abnormalities in brain structure and function. This listing of 
studies includes only those related to brain abnormalities; additional studies have been 
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Neuroleptic-Naïve Patients with Schizophrenia, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 761–67 (2002); J. Tauscher, J. et 
al., Brain Serotonin 5-HT1A Receptor Binding in Schizophrenia Measured by Positron Emission 
Tomography and (11C)WAY- 100635, 59 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 514–20 (2002); C.S. Carter et al., 
Prospective Longitudinal fMRI Study of Prefrontal Cortex Based Context Processing in Never Medicated 
First-Episode Schizophrenia (abstract), 60 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 214 (2003); Jean Théberge et al., Glutamate 
and Glutamine Measured with 4.0 T Proton MRS in Never-Treated Patients with Schizophrenia and 
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PSYCHIATRY 453–55 (2003); J.A. Stanley et al., Age and Comorbidity Effects in First-Episode Never-
Medicated Schizophrenia Subjects: An In Vivo 1H Spectroscopy Study (abstract), 53 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 
178S (2003); and Perumbava N. Jayakumar et al., Membrane Phospholipid Abnormalities of Basal Ganglia 
in Never-Treated Schizophrenia: A 31P Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy Study 54 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 
491–94 (2003); D. Fannon et al., Selective Deficit of Hippocampal N-Acetylaspartate in Antipsychotic-
Naïve Patients with Schizophrenia, 54 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 587–98 (2003); M.-C. Hsiao et al., Dopamine 
Transporter Change in Drug-Naïve Schizophrenia: An Imaging Study with 99mTc-TRODAT-1, 65 
SCHIZOPHR. RES. 39–46 (2003); B.N. Gangadhar et al., Basal Ganglia High-Energy Phosphate Metabolism 
in Neuroleptic-Naïve Patients with Schizophrenia: A 31-Phosphorus Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopic 
Study, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1304–1306 (2004); D. S. Lehrer et al., Prefrontal, Striatal and Thalamic 
FDG Uptake in Never-Medicated Patients with Schizophrenia (abstract) 55 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 166S 
(2004); A.-L. Nordstrom, D2 Receptor Binding in Drug-Naïve Patients Examined with FLB457 and 
Raclopride (abstract), 55 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 72S (2004).
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carried out on antipsychotic-naïve patients with schizophrenia that have demonstrated 
other types of abnormalities such as altered interleukins, nerve growth factor, and red 
blood cell membrane essential fatty acids.62 Studies of medication-naïve patients thus 
demonstrate that abnormalities in schizophrenia are part of the disease process, not a 
result of medication being taken to treat the disease. 
For neurological, neuropsychological, and neurophysiological abnormalities of 
cerebral function, in fact, there is evidence suggesting that antipsychotic medications 
decrease the abnormalities and return the brain to more normal function. This is 
consistent with the known effectiveness of antipsychotic medications in reducing the 
clinical symptoms of schizophrenia.
The 103 studies cited, which were restricted to those in which the patients had not 
previously taken antipsychotic medication, are part of a much larger cohort of studies of 
cerebral structure and function in patients who had been medicated. Studies of neurologic 
soft signs in schizophrenia, for example, number over 50, and studies of 
neuropsychological abnormalities number well over 200.63 Altogether, there are now over 
1,000 published studies on brain structure and function in individuals with schizophrenia.
It should also be emphasized that none of the cerebral abnormalities cited above 
are specific to schizophrenia. All of them can be found in some other brain diseases and 
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occasionally in normal individuals, although they occur statistically more frequently in 
individuals with schizophrenia. Thus, the brain abnormalities found in schizophrenia are 
similar to the tremor seen in many patients with Parkinson’s disease. Tremor may also be 
found in other brain diseases; it occurs in some normal individuals [benign intention 
tremor], but it occurs statistically much more frequently in Parkinson’s disease.
III. Anosognosia: Competence To Make Informed Treatment Decisions
Advances in the understanding of anosognosia in recent years have profound 
implications for mental health laws. Anosognosia remains, however, little known and 
poorly understood, both by the legislators who make the laws and by the law enforcement 
officials and judges who implement them. Indeed, only recently a small number of 
mental health law scholars became aware of the phenomenon.64 In Descartes’ Error, 
neurologist Antonio Damasio called anosognosia “one of the most eccentric 
neuropsychological presentations one is likely to encounter.”65 Neurologist Oliver Sacks 
in The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat described anosognosia as being “singularly 
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difficult, for even the most sensitive observer, to picture the inner state … for this is 
unimaginably remote from anything he himself has ever known.”66
Etymologically, anosognosia is derived from the Greek nosos, “disease,” and 
gnosis, “knowledge.” It literally means to not know a disease. As commonly used, it 
means to not know one’s own disease and is used interchangeably with such terms as 
“lack of awareness of illness” and “lack of insight.” In psychiatry, anosognosia usually 
connotes three overlapping dimensions: the failure to recognize that one has a psychiatric 
disease; the inability to recognize that one’s unusual mental events, such as delusions and 
hallucinations are pathological; and noncompliance with treatment.67 Anosognosia is a 
biologically based inability to appreciate one’s own illness. Thus, it differs from denial, 
which is a psychologically based mechanism we all commonly use. In some individuals 
with brain disorders, anosognosia and denial may both be operant.
A. Before 1975: Confined to Neurology
Anosognosia has been known to neurologists for over a century. In 1893, Gabriel 
Anton in Germany published a paper describing a patient who had become paralyzed on 
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his side from a stroke but who claimed that there was nothing wrong.68 Additional cases 
were reported, and in 1914 Joseph Babinski, at a meeting of the French Neurological 
Society, coined the term “anosognosia” to describe this curious syndrome.69
By mid-century, anosognosia had become well established in the neurological 
literature and was usually associated with strokes or brain tumors. A 1952 review of one 
hundred cases of stroke reported that twenty-three of them had complete anosognosia and 
five others “fluctuated in their responses from awareness to total denial.”70 As examples 
of anosognosia, the authors cited:
One patient, when asked why she could not move her hand, said, 
“Somebody has a hold of it….” One woman when asked whether she 
could walk said, “I could walk at home, but not here. It’s slippery here.” 
One patient, when asked if anything was wrong with his arm, said, “It’s 
just a little stiff—from the cold or something.” When asked why he 
couldn’t raise it, he said, “I have a shirt on.”71
In 1955, a neurological monograph described fifty-two additional cases of complete 
anosognosia. Included were examples such as the following:
The patient denied there was anything the matter with her left arm or leg. 
When asked to raise her left arm, she repeatedly raised her left leg. When 
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this error was pointed out to her, she said, “Oh, some people call it an 
arm, some a leg. What’s the difference!”72
In some cases of stroke-associated anosognosia, the anosognosia remits as the person’s 
stroke resolves and the patient can then acknowledge the problem, but in many cases the 
person’s anosognosia is permanent.
One of the most striking aspects of these cases of anosognosia is the absence of 
concern in the person affected. As Damasio describes it: “The lack of update on the real 
states of body and person is nothing less than astounding … [including] the lack of 
concern they show for their overall situation, the lack of emotion they exhibit, the lack of 
feeling they report when questioned about it.”73
In contrast to neurology, prior to 1975 there was almost no discussion of 
anosognosia among individuals with psychiatric disorders. There had been observations 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that individuals with what was then called 
“insanity” were often unaware of their own illness, but connection to the neurologists’ 
concept of anosognosia was not made. For example, in 1869, an article in the American 
Law Review noted: “Generally, insane people do not regard themselves as insane and, 
consequently, can see no reason for their confinement other than the malevolent designs 
of those who have deprived them of their liberty.”74 Some psychiatrists of that period 
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even suggested that lack of awareness of one’s insanity should be the central criterion for 
the form of insanity then labeled “moral insanity.”75 It was an echo of Thomas Dekker’s 
1604 play The Honest Whore, in which a character declaims: “That proves you mad 
because you know it not.”76
By the early twentieth century, psychiatrists occasionally noted lack of insight in 
psychiatric patients. Emil Kraepelin, for example, in his classic 1919 textbook observed 
that “understanding of the disease disappears fairly rapidly as the malady progresses in 
the overwhelming majority of cases, even where in the beginning it was more or less 
clearly present.”77
At the time Kraepelin published his textbook, the writings of Sigmund Freud were 
already circulating in Europe and the United States. Freud taught that denial was one of 
the most common and important defense mechanisms used by people. As Freud’s 
theories became more widely known, the concept of denial became increasingly 
influential and was invoked to explain why individuals with schizophrenia and other 
severe psychiatric disorders did not acknowledge their illnesses. Denial as a 
psychologically-based defense mechanism continued to be a prominent psychiatric 
explanatory principle throughout the twentieth century. Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
when laws governing the treatment of psychiatric patients were undergoing changes, 
there was no discussion regarding the possibility that unawareness of one’s illness might 
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be a biologically-based symptom of the illness. The concept of anosognosia simply did 
not exist in the corpus of psychiatric writings.
B. Since 1975: Established in Psychiatry
Since the mid- 1970s, there has been a marked increase in interest in, and 
understanding of, anosognosia. This increase can be measured by the number of articles 
written about anosognosia, as determined by a search of the National Library of 
Medicine’s database.78 Between 1970 and 1979, 12 articles about anosognosia were 
published; from 1980 to 1989, 50 additional articles were published; and between 1990 
and 1999, the number was 119. This increased interest is reflected in both neurology and 
psychiatry.
1. Alzheimer’s Disease and Huntington’s Disease
In the 1980s, neurologists extended their interest in anosognosia from strokes and 
brain tumors to Alzheimer’s disease and Huntington’s disease. In Alzheimer’s disease, 
studies showed that patients in the earliest stages of the disease are aware of, and 
increasingly anxious about, their memory problems. Once beyond the early stages, 
however, most individuals with Alzheimer’s diseases become less anxious and gradually 
lose awareness of their deficits.79 Recent studies have also reported that anosognosia is 
most common in Alzheimer’s patients who have the most severe cognitive impairments 
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and deficits in activities of daily living, although not all studies have found a linear 
relationship.80 Several researchers have noted that individuals with Alzheimer’s disease 
may have almost total anosognosia for their cognitive deficits, such as memory loss, and 
yet, at the same time, retain awareness for other aspects of function, such as their 
behavior.81 The fact that individuals can be completely unaware of some aspects of their 
brain function yet aware of other aspects is often confusing to family members and other 
observers.
Huntington’s disease is another neurological illness in which anosognosia is 
found, especially in the later stages of the disease. Huntington’s disease is genetically 
transmitted and includes abnormal movements and severe memory impairment. One 
study of thirty patients with Huntington’s disease reported that seven of them had 
complete, and four others partial, anosognosia.82 Especially striking in Huntington’s 
disease is the possibility that anosognosia may occur for both the person’s memory 
impairment and also for their abnormal movements. Thus, one patient was described as 
follows:
He fidgeted, sat about, got up, sat about some more and was 
euphoric. When I asked about his ability to perform certain 
movements, he said he was fine and walked over to the bookcase, 
picked up a book and threw it into the air and let it crash to the 
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deck. This event did not worry him; he just said it was a 
mistake.83
It is important to note that not all neurological diseases are accompanied by 
anosognosia. Most patients with Parkinson’s disease, for example, retain relatively good 
comprehension of their illness. One study compared thirty-three patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease with thirty-three patients with Parkinson’s disease on awareness of 
illness, and the patients with Parkinson’s disease had almost no anosognosia.84
2. Schizophrenia
The concept of anosognosia was not clearly linked to schizophrenia until the 
1980s. Joseph McEvoy, a psychiatrist at the University of Pittsburgh, began investigating 
the link between lack of awareness of illness and the need for involuntary treatment in 
individuals with schizophrenia. McEvoy and his associates developed a scale, the Insight 
and Treatment Attitudes Questionnaire (ITAQ), to measure awareness of illness and 
noted that “committed patients require coercive hospitalization because they fail to 
recognize their need for care.”85
In the early 1990s, anosognosia rapidly ascended to prominence in psychiatric 
writings. Xavier Amador, a psychologist at Columbia University in New York, and 
Anthony David, a psychiatrist at the Institute of Psychiatry in London, began studies with 
their colleagues that have continued to the present. Both groups developed assessment 
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tools that can be used to measure awareness of illness: the Scale to Assess Unawareness 
of Mental Illness (SUMD) and the Schedule for the Assessment of Insight (SAI), 
respectively.86 The availability of instruments that can be used to measure anosognosia in 
large groups of patients has advanced this research area rapidly.
One issue on which there has been an emerging consensus is the percentage of 
individuals with schizophrenia who have anosognosia. A study carried out by Amador 
and his colleagues reported that 57% of patients with schizophrenia “had moderate to 
severe unawareness of having a mental disorder.”87 Another study of eighty-seven stable 
outpatients with schizophrenia, all of whom were receiving treatment, found that 50% 
“were rated as having at least a moderate impairment in insight about their illness.”88 The 
large MacArthur treatment competence study similarly found that approximately half of 
the individuals with schizophrenia lacked an understanding of their illness and/or an 
appreciation of the importance of treatment.89 Another study directly compared patients
with schizophrenia and patients with focal neurological disorders, such as strokes and 
brain tumors, on awareness of their illnesses. Among the patients with schizophrenia, 
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47% were unaware of their illness, while among the neurological patients, 57% were
unaware.90
Studies thus demonstrate that approximately half of all individuals with 
schizophrenia have moderate to severe impairment in awareness of their illness. 
Moreover, it appears that this impairment in awareness occurs somewhat more often in 
individuals whose symptoms of schizophrenia are more severe,91 but that it is not a direct 
product of delusions, depression, or other symptoms. Rather, the impairment in 
awareness of illness seen in individuals with schizophrenia is itself a symptom of the 
disease and is true anosognosia. Thus, it is the same phenomenon as is observed in many 
neurological patients with strokes, brain tumors, Alzheimer’s disease, and Huntington’s 
disease.
Studies of individuals with schizophrenia who also have tardive dyskinesia 
illustrate the fundamental similarity of anosognosia found in schizophrenia and that found 
in individuals with neurological disorders. Tardive dyskinesia is a side effect of 
antipsychotic medication commonly used to treat schizophrenia and occurs in 
approximately 10% of patients. It consists of involuntary movements of the tongue and 
jaw and, in more severe cases, the arms and legs.
As early as 1970, it was noted that many individuals with schizophrenia who also 
had tardive dyskinesia appeared to be unaware of their own involuntary movements.92
Since that time, at least eight studies have been carried out confirming this. In one study, 
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for example, “75% of [the] patients were completely or partially unaware of their 
abnormal involuntary movements”; in another study, “most of them (88%) were 
oblivious to or not concerned with their abnormalities, despite noticeable disturbances of 
speech that these symptoms incurred.”93 In 1985, Myslobodsky and his colleagues 
correctly labeled this lack of awareness of symptoms of tardive dyskinesia a form of 
anosognosia.94
Other studies have demonstrated that individuals with schizophrenia who are 
unaware of their tardive dyskinesia are also likely to be unaware of their schizophrenia, 
thus suggesting that unawareness of the neurological and psychiatric symptoms are part 
of the same process.95 Studies of anosognosia in individuals who have schizophrenia and 
tardive dyskinesia have also reported that some individuals who are unaware of their own 
abnormal movements may be completely aware of similar abnormal movements in other 
patients.96 This finding is similar to studies showing that individuals with schizophrenia 
who are not aware of their own psychiatric symptoms, such as delusions and 
hallucinations, may be fully aware of the same symptoms in other patients.”97
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Another question that has received considerable research attention is whether 
awareness of illness can be improved in individuals with schizophrenia. Attempts have 
been made to do this with specific forms of psychotherapy98 and with antipsychotic 
medications. Studies to date suggest that medication can improve awareness of illness in 
approximately one-third of those for whom it is lacking, but the majority of individuals 
do not show much improvement, even though other symptoms of their illness may 
improve.99 Claims have also been made that one or another type of antipsychotic 
medication is more effective in improving awareness of illness, but none of these claims 
have been substantiated.100
3. Anatomical Localization of Anosognosia
Debate about the possible anatomical localization of anosognosia has been taking 
place for a century. It was early noted that anosognosia in individuals with strokes and 
brain tumors occurred most often when the brain lesions were in the right hemisphere. 
Subsequent studies have confirmed that right hemisphere lesions are four times more 
likely to produce anosognosia compared to left hemisphere lesions.101 Thus, it appears 
unaware of their own tongue or mouth movements, it is difficult to see how they could not have observed 
their own hand, feet, or leg movement (see SMITH ET AL., A SYSTEMATIC INVESTIGATION).
98 R. Kemp et al., Can Insight and Compliance Be Improved in Psychosis? (abstract) 15 SCHIZOPHR. 
RES. 217 (1995). Psychological attempts to improve what we now call anosognosia date to Dr. Benjamin 
Rush’s efforts in the early nineteenth century. “He urged the insane to write their thoughts and secrets on 
paper in hopes that when they saw what they had written they would be shocked into rejecting their 
pathological ideas” (see NORMAN DAIN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789, 20 (1964)).
99 P. Jørgensen, Recovery and Insight in Schizophrenia 92 ACTA PSYCHIATR. SCAND. 436–40 
(1995).
100 Stefano Pallanti et al., Effects of Clozapine on Awareness of Illness and Cognition in 
Schizophrenia 86 PSYCHIATRY RES. 239–49 (1999); Martha Sajatovic et al., Insight into Illness and 
Attitudes Toward Medications Among Inpatients with Schizophrenia 53 PSYCHIATR. SERV. 1319–21 
(2002); Eugenio Aguglia et al., Insight in Persons with Schizophrenia: Effects of Switching from 
Conventional Neuroleptics to Atypical Antipsychotics 26 PROG. NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOL. BIOL 
PSYCHIATRY 1229–33 (2002).
101 John Cutting, Study of Anosognosia, 41 J. NEUROL. NEUROSURG. PSYCHIATRY 548 (1978).
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that brain circuits controlling self-awareness are situated predominantly in the right 
hemisphere in the majority of people.
Attempts to localize the origins of anosognosia more precisely are continuing but 
have yielded inconsistent data. A major reason for this is that, anatomically, brain areas 
are discrete, but functionally, they are extensively interconnected with each other; thus, 
abnormal function in one part of the brain inevitably affects many other areas. 
Computerized tomography (CT) scans of individuals who have had strokes have 
associated anosognosia with the inferior parietal lobule, the thalamus, and basal 
ganglia.102 Other researchers have also stressed the importance of the inferior parietal 
lobule in producing anosognosia in individuals with strokes and brain tumors, while 
others have also suggested involvement of the insula.103 A CT scan study of individuals 
with Alzheimer’s disease, in contrast to the above, reported abnormalities in the 
prefrontal region in the right hemisphere, while a similar study of individuals with 
Huntington’s disease suggested that the caudate portion of the basal ganglia was 
associated with anosognosia.104
Attempts to localize the anatomical basis of anosognosia in schizophrenia have 
also yielded conflicting data. Such attempts have been carried out using 
neuropsychological testing and neuroimaging techniques such as CT and MRI scans. 
Multiple studies have attempted to correlate measures of unawareness of illness, using 
assessment scales such as described previously, with neuropsychological measures of 
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102 BISIACH & GEMINIANI, ANOSOGNOSIA RELATED TO HEMIPLEGIA AND HEMIANOPIA.
103 For a thorough discussion of these theories, see Susan M. McGlynn & Daniel L. Schacter, 
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104 Bruce R. Reed et al., Anosognosia in Alzheimer’s Disease: Relationships to Depression, Cognitive 
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frontal lobe function. The neuropsychological test most widely used has been one that 
measures the ability of a person to rapidly shift their analytic mindset.105 The results of 
these studies have been contradictory, with several claiming that anosognosia correlates 
with impairment on this test, whereas others have reported no correlation.106 One attempt 
has also been made to correlate unawareness of illness with neuropsychological measures 
of parietal lobe function.107 A major problem with all such attempts using 
neuropsychological measures is that such measures are relatively nonspecific for 
anatomical areas of the brain.
The use of neuroimaging techniques to localize anosognosia in individuals with 
schizophrenia has also yielded contradictory findings. Two studies examined the size of 
the brain ventricles; one reported that enlarged brain ventricles were found more 
frequently in individuals with impaired awareness of illness, but the other found no 
association.108 Two other studies measured brain volume; one reported that decreased 
brain volume occurred more commonly in individuals with decreased awareness of 
illness, but the other study did not.109
Other researchers have focused neuroimaging attention to specific parts of the 
brain. Two studies have reported decreased volumes of specific parts of the frontal lobe 
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107 Laura Flashman et al., Unawareness of Illness in Schizophrenia: Relationship to Frontal and 
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in individuals who have impaired awareness of illness, and another has reported 
generalized atrophy of the frontal lobe in such cases.110 Still another study, carried out in 
individuals with schizophrenia who had recently developed the disease, found that 
deficits in the cingulate gyrus and insula correlated with poor awareness of illness.111
Given advances in neuroimaging techniques, such research is likely to move 
forward rapidly in the coming years. At this point in time, the most that can be said with 
certainty regarding the anatomical localization of anosognosia is that it primarily involves 
the right hemisphere of the brain and that the inferior parietal and frontal lobes are 
involved. The fact that there are very close connections between these two areas, as well 
as to the thalamus and cingulate, which appear to also be involved in anosognosia, 
provides a promising basis for future research.
4. Consequences of Anosognosia
It has been increasingly recognized that anosognosia may have adverse 
consequences. Individuals who are unaware of their brain disorder often refuse treatment 
and may behave in a manner that endangers themselves or other people.
For Alzheimer’s disease, such consequences were illustrated by the publicized 
case of Ralph Thompson, an eighty-two-year-old man who suffered from this disorder. 
On November 8, 2000, Mr. Thompson was stopped by a police officer in the District of 
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Columbia for driving erratically. Mr. Thompson reacted angrily, challenging the officer 
to either arrest him or let him go. Since there were no legal grounds for arrest, the officer 
released him; eight hours later, Mr. Thompson died after his car swerved across the 
median and hit two oncoming tractor-trailers. The news account of this tragedy noted that 
“it can still be nearly impossible to rescue or help people who don’t know they need 
either.”112
Other accounts verify the fact that “people with Alzheimer’s disease … are 
increasingly getting entangled with law enforcement” because of their anosognosia.113
Most often, they are taken into police custody “after they wander away from their homes 
or caretakers and are found acting erratically.”114 Occasionally, however, such individuals 
commit crimes, including homicides, because of their brain dysfunction.
For individuals with schizophrenia, the consequences of anosognosia include 
noncompliance with medication, relapse, homelessness, incarceration, and violent 
behavior.
a. Noncompliance with Medication
There are many reasons why people do not take medication that has been 
prescribed for them by a physician, including the cost of the medication, side effects, and 
concurrent substance abuse, among others. For individuals with schizophrenia, however, 
the main reason they do not take medication is anosognosia—they do not believe they are 
sick and therefore do not believe they need medication.
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At least fifteen studies have identified lack of awareness of illness as a major 
determinant of medication noncompliance in individuals with schizophrenia. In one 
study, for example, individuals who were unaware of their illness were only half as likely 
to take medication compared to individuals who were aware.115 In another study, 63% of 
psychiatric patients with anosognosia were noncompliant with medications compared to a 
24% noncompliance rate for patients who were aware of their illness.116 As reported in 
another study, “the participants who were more aware of their mental illnesses and of the 
beneficial effects of medication were more likely to be compliant with prescribed 
medications.”117
b. Relapse, Homelessness and Incarceration
Since individuals with schizophrenia who have impaired awareness of illness are 
less likely to be compliant with helpful medication, it logically follows that the outcome 
of their illness is more likely to be problematic. Multiple studies have confirmed this.
For example, studies have shown that individuals with schizophrenia who are 
noncompliant with medication have significantly more frequent and more severe relapses, 
compared to individuals who are compliant.118 Additional studies have shown that having 
impaired awareness of illness predicts more admissions to hospitals, and especially more 
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involuntary admissions.119 In one of those studies, “only 8% of patients with insight 
required hospitalization for their relapse, in contrast to 50% of those without insight.”120
Other studies have shown that individuals with schizophrenia with impaired 
awareness of illness have poorer social and rehabilitation outcomes. One study found a 
correlation between poor insight and poor social skills.121 A rehabilitation study similarly 
reported that “poor insight was significantly related to fewer weeks of participation as 
well as poorer social skills and personal presentation on the job.”122
Homelessness is a common outcome for many individuals with schizophrenia and 
other severe psychiatric disorders, with multiple studies estimating that approximately 
one-third of the homeless population have these disorders. Many of these individuals also 
have problems with substance abuse. A 1989 study of individuals discharged from a state 
psychiatric hospital reported that among those who became predominantly homeless, 
63% were noncompliant with medication, whereas among those who remained in stable 
housing, only 18% were noncompliant.123 Other studies have reported that 
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noncompliance with medication is a risk factor for becoming homeless among men and 
women with schizophrenia.124
Arrest and incarceration in jails and prisons is another increasingly common 
outcome for individuals with schizophrenia and other severe psychiatric disorders. A 
1998 Department of Justice survey reported that 16% of inmates in the nation’s jails and 
prisons were mentally ill.125 This includes a growing number of mentally ill repeat 
offenders, such as Gloria Rodgers in Memphis, who in 1998 was reported to have had 
258 previous arrests and to have been jailed 114 times in the previous four years.126
As far as the authors are aware, no study has specifically assessed awareness of 
illness among mentally ill prisoners. There is evidence, however, that such individuals 
tend to have been noncompliant with medication prior to their arrest and therefore can be 
assumed to have less awareness of their illness. One study of mentally ill individuals who 
have been arrested found that “two highly significant predictors of arrest were substance 
abuse … and noncompliance with medication.”127
A study of sixty-five patients with severe psychiatric disorders discharged from 
an Ohio state psychiatric hospital illustrates the problem. Within six months, thirty-three 
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of the sixty-five individuals had become homeless, and twenty-one of these had been 
arrested and jailed. Most of them had been arrested for misdemeanors, such as 
threatening and bizarre behaviors. The authors of the report noted that “psychotropic 
medication had been prescribed upon their discharges from the state hospital, but the 
respondents failed to take their medication.”128
c. Violent Behavior
Violent behavior by individuals with schizophrenia and other severe psychiatric 
disorders is another important consequence of anosognosia. In recent years, three studies 
have been carried out that link violent behavior directly to impaired awareness of illness. 
One study, carried out in Ohio, assessed 122 patients with schizophrenia who had 
committed violent acts and compared them with 111 patients with schizophrenia who had 
not committed such acts. The violent patients had more symptoms and significantly less 
awareness of their illness.129 A second study, carried out in New York, examined causes 
of behavior in sixty severely mentally ill men who had been charged with violent crimes. 
The authors reported that lack of awareness of illness and medication noncompliance 
both played significant roles in causing the men’s violent behavior.130 Finally, a study 
carried out in Spain on sixty-three patients with schizophrenia admitted to a psychiatric 
hospital assessed both their violent behavior and their awareness of illness. The authors 
reported a statistically significant association between impaired awareness of illness and 
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increased violent acts and concluded that “the single variable that best predicted violence 
was [impaired] insight into psychotic symptoms.”131
Finding a relationship between impaired awareness of illness and increased 
violent behavior in individuals with schizophrenia is not surprising, since there is 
abundant evidence that medication noncompliance is also linked to increased violent 
behavior. Anecdotal stories abound and are frequently seen in media accounts of 
tragedies, e.g., “his daughter was not taking her medication at the time of the slaying.”132
There are also multiple studies showing that individuals with severe psychiatric disorders 
who are unmedicated or undermedicated are significantly more likely to commit violent 
acts.133
In summary, anosognosia has important consequences for individuals with 
schizophrenia and other severe psychiatric disorders. It is a major determinant of 
medication noncompliance; increases the chances of relapse, homelessness, and 
incarceration; and increases violent behavior. Any legislation bearing on the treatment of 
psychiatrically ill individuals must take anosognosia into account.
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IV. The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act: California, 1969
One of the most important state mental health laws enacted in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s was the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, widely referred to as LPS, which went 
into effect in California on July 1, 1969.134 It was widely referred to as “the Magna Carta 
of the mentally ill” and said to include “the broadest changes in the procedures for the 
involuntary commitment of the mentally disordered since the process began in the early 
1800s.”135
Speaking at the time the bill was passed, Assemblyman Frank Lanterman, the 
prime mover of the legislation, said that “the entire thrust of the Lanterman-Petris-Short 
Act is to promote voluntary treatment for the mentally disordered. . . . provisions for 
involuntary treatment have been written so that they are the last resort rather than the 
first, as is now so often the case.”136 The legislation restricts initial involuntary 
hospitalization to individuals who are dangerous to others, dangerous to self, or gravely 
disabled and is for a maximum of 17 days. Suicidal individuals may be held involuntarily 
for an additional 14 days. Involuntary commitments for up to 90 days beyond the initial 
17 days are restricted to those individuals who are deemed to be “imminently dangerous” 
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to others. This extended commitment had to be approved by a court hearing at which the 
detained individual had the right to be represented by a lawyer and could demand a jury 
trial. The criteria for approval of a 90-day commitment were very strict; as Lanterman 
explained it, “physical evidence of danger must be displayed in a court of law.”137
The core of the LPS Act was “the absolute termination of indefinite periods of 
involuntary commitment.”138 Under previous California mental health laws, commitment 
criteria merely required that individuals be “of such mental condition that they are in 
need of supervision, treatment, care or restraint.”139 This was basically a need-for-
hospitalization standard, and the length of such commitments could be indeterminate. 
Under the new law, the only grounds for long-term commitment was imminent 
dangerousness to others, and the commitment must be reviewed by the court every 90 
days.
At the time of its passage, LPS was widely praised by legal advocates for mental 
health reform. Prominent mental health law jurists such as Judge David Bazelon noted 
that LPS “promises virtually to eliminate involuntary hospitalization except for short 
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term crisis situations.”140 LPS was also praised by Bruce Ennis, the director of the New 
York Civil Liberties Union Mental Illness Litigation Project, who called LPS “far from 
perfect,” insofar as it retained grounds for any involuntary commitment, but commended 
it for restricting such commitments “to persons who have committed dangerous acts and 
are demonstrably dangerous to themselves or to others.”141 One of the most notable 
aspects of LPS was the enthusiastic support it drew from both conservative and liberal 
ends of the political spectrum.142
A. Assumptions Regarding the Causes of Psychiatric Disorders
The assumptions underlying the LPS Act were laid out in The Dilemma of Mental 
Commitments in California, a 1966 report of the California Assembly’s Subcommittee on 
Mental Health Services. Assemblyman Nicholas Petris, the “P” in LPS, became chairman 
of this subcommittee in June 1966. The report, often referred to as the Dilemma Report, 
was the planning document for the LPS legislation.
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been duped by such Communist Schemes as Fluoridation and ‘Mental Health’ especially since both the 
American Legion and the D.A.R. have publicly branded ‘Mental Health’ as a Communist Plot to take over 
our country” (see E. Fuller Torrey, NOWHERE TO GO: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY 
ILL 88ff (1988)). Thus, there was widespread support among California conservatives for decreasing the 
use of involuntary commitments and for phasing out state psychiatric hospitals. The second major sponsor 
of the LPS Act, Nicholas Petris, was a liberal Democrat from Oakland. Liberal Californians supported LPS 
and its restriction of involuntary commitments in order to protect civil rights.
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The Dilemma Report discussed in detail the nature of mental illness, which it 
defined as “a nonscientific, generalized, popular label used to explain or describe a wide 
range of behavior which is considered ‘peculiar’ or ‘sick’ or ‘objectionable.’” The report 
continued:
It is also evident that when a person’s behavior is labeled “mental 
illness,” those who do the labeling are guided by their own conceptions 
of what is normal and abnormal. Madness, like beauty, may exist in the 
eye of the beholder.143
The sponsors of the LPS legislation clearly shared these assumptions about the 
nature of psychiatric disorders. Frank Lanterman referred to patients in state psychiatric 
hospitals as “unwanted, burdensome and eccentric members of society.”144 Similarly, 
Nicholas Petris called the hospitals “warehouses for the idiosyncratic, the aged, the 
senile, the odd, and the different” and further added: “We remembered that throughout 
history some of today’s madman can become tomorrow’s heroes.”145 In stating such 
views, Petris acknowledged having been influenced by the thinking of antipsychiatry 
activists in San Francisco who at that time were publishing the “Madness Network 
News.” Petris labeled as “provocative” their thesis “that either we are all mad or none of 
us is mad.”146
The Dilemma Report and assumptions of the LPS architects were profoundly 
influenced by antipsychiatry writers prominent in the 1960s. One of these was Thomas 
Scheff, a sociologist at the University of California who believed that mental illness 
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existed only because eccentric persons were so labeled. His writings were referenced 
multiple times in the Dilemma Report and were also reflected by Petris when he claimed 
that psychiatric professionals use a “middle-class model” in determining who may be 
mentally ill.147
Also influential in the deliberations of the LPS architects was Don Jackson, a Palo 
Alto psychiatrist who believed that families cause mental illness in general and 
schizophrenia in particular. For example, Petris publicly claimed that “the ‘patient’ is 
only one part of a family problem and . . . his bizarre behavior may be a very appropriate 
response to other family members.”148 In the bibliography of the Dilemma Report, 
Jackson’s writings were listed seven times, more than any other individual.149
Erving Goffman, a sociologist, was influential as well. The book for which 
Goffman was best known, Asylums, was praised in the Dilemma Report as “a most 
incisive and revealing study of the dehumanizing effects of institutional living.”150
Goffman had argued that the experience of being hospitalized for individuals labeled as 
mentally ill was the cause of many of their symptoms. Such thinking was reflected in 
Lanterman’s statement that, following commitment, “by the time the individual receives 
any treatment, his condition is often worse than it was when he was apprehended.”151
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Finally, the architects of the LPS Act were influenced in their thinking about 
psychiatric disorders by the writings of Thomas Szasz. Szasz, a psychiatrist, had 
published The Myth of Mental Illness in 1961 and Law, Liberty and Psychiatry two years 
later, and his ideas were being widely discussed in late 1960s. The Dilemma Report cited 
Szasz as “a vocal champion of eliminating involuntary treatment” and referenced his 
1966 article in the New York Times Magazine entitled “Mental Illness Is a Myth.” In the 
article, Szasz said that “labeling someone mentally ill is a special kind of name-calling,” 
and that stopping all involuntary commitments to mental hospitals and emptying the 
hospitals are “to be sure…desirable goals.”152
In summary, the architects of the LPS legislation, which profoundly changed 
commitment laws in California and influenced the laws in many other states, clearly did 
not subscribe to biological theories of psychiatric disorders. Instead they claimed that 
what is called mental illness was merely an arbitrarily assigned label for various forms of 
deviant behavior. Since mental illness was merely a labeling problem, there was no legal 
justification for the involuntary commitment of such individuals to hospitals.
B. Assumptions Regarding Competence To Make Informed Treatment Decisions
The architects of the LPS Act believed that almost all individuals with psychiatric 
disorders are competent to make informed decisions about whether or not they need 
treatment. Lanterman noted that “individuals are involuntarily hospitalized and treated 
with little regard to their own desires concerning hospitalization or treatment.” He 
________________________________________________________________________
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explicitly rejected any suggestion that such individuals may not be aware of their own 
illness:
For too many years the presumption has been that a mentally disturbed 
individual will not admit to being “sick” and will not accept recommended 
treatment. Therefore, it is thought necessary to contain him so he cannot 
escape from treatment. This is sometimes justified on the grounds that 
“the individual will later recognize it was all for his own good.” To me 
this concept is indefensible.
The proposed legislation, said Lanterman, would free “thousands of persons from the 
‘tyranny of help,’ which has camouflaged for so many years the denial of liberty and 
basic human dignity.”153
The Dilemma Report explicitly assumed that individuals with psychiatric 
disorders are rational and capable of making intelligent decisions regarding their own 
needs. The report emphasized that under the LPS legislation “citizens will be free to 
decide whether they wish to enter or leave the hospitals.” The report also claimed that 
much disturbed behavior exhibited by hospitalized patients is not due to the fact that 
patients are not capable of thinking rationally but rather is a byproduct of being 
involuntarily hospitalized: “The virtual disappearance of antisocial and irresponsible 
behavior when patients are treated and trusted as responsible fellow beings is most 
convincing and forces us to a total re-examination of our traditional procedures.”154
At several points the Dilemma Report stressed the need for all treatment to be 
voluntary:
“…these citizens will be voluntary patients in every sense”
________________________________________________________________________
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“…it is difficult to accept the notion that sending a wide variety of people 
to institutions against their wishes can be justified because ‘they are in 
need of treatment.’”
Making the treatment system a voluntary system would, according to the report, 
fundamentally change the nature of state psychiatric hospitals. “When these steps have 
been taken, state hospitals as we know them will no longer exist.”155
In summary, in repealing the existing civil commitment scheme and replacing it 
with a scheme relying almost entirely on voluntary treatment, the LPS Act assumed that
most individuals with psychiatric disorders are competent and capable of seeking 
treatment when they need it. There is no mention in the planning documents or legislation 
that some individuals may have impaired awareness of their illness. The only 
acknowledgement that impaired awareness was even possible was for individuals with 
chronic organic brain syndromes such as may be found in individuals with chronic 
alcoholism or Alzheimer’s disease. The LPS Act allowed for conservatorships in such 
cases.156
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C. The Effects of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act
California’s LPS Act influenced legislation in many other states. Washington 
State implemented a similar law in 1974.157 By 1975, it was being said that “many 
psychiatrists view LPS as the model law to be adopted by other states,” and 
Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania were moving toward new legislation 
“closely patterned after the success of LPS.”158 By 1988, it was noted that “most state 
commitment statutes today are modeled after California’s Lanterman-Petris-Short 
Act.”159
In California, the changes in commitment procedures mandated by the LPS Act 
brought about immediate changes in California’s mental health system. Since 
commitments were so difficult to obtain, petitions for commitment orders decreased 
sharply, and by 1978, it was said that there had been “a 99 percent decrease in the 
number of petitions filed with the courts.”160 For the small number of mentally ill 
individuals who were involuntarily admitted, the average length of hospital stay 
decreased from 180 days prior to LPS to 15 days four years later.161
Furthermore, since many patients who were already in the hospitals at the time 
LPS was implemented did not meet criteria of imminent dangerousness to others, they 
had to be discharged. The number of patients in California state psychiatric hospitals thus 
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decreased from 18,831 to 12,671 in the first two years following passage of LPS162 and 
further decreased to 7,000 by 1973,163 a 63% decrease in just four years.
Many of the discharged patients went to live with family members and did well. 
However, many others were housed in board-and-care homes. An observer in 1971 noted 
that many of the board-and-care homes “are in most respects like small long-term state 
hospital wards isolated from the community. . . . It is only an illusion that patients who 
are placed in boarding or family-care homes are ‘in the community.’”164 A 1972 follow-
up of 170 patients who had been discharged from state hospitals under LPS reported that 
“more than two-thirds are living in an institutional setting,” including hospitals, boarding 
homes, and prisons.165
Especially troubling was the fact that many of the board-and-care homes were 
clustered in inner cities, often forming “ghettos of former state hospital patients.”166 In 
San Jose in 1973, for example, it was said that “in a 20-square-block area—an area also 
heavily populated by alcoholics, drug users, and prostitutes—live over 1,100 of the 
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mentally disordered.”167 Most of them had come from nearby Agnews State Hospital, 
which had closed in 1972.
Not surprisingly, many of the discharged patients who were not receiving 
treatment became homeless, evoking protest “from an alarmed general public, concerned 
for public safety.”168 The number of discharged patients who ended up homeless is also 
reflected by studies of mentally ill persons in the Los Angeles County jail in the early 
1980s: 36% of the mentally ill men and 42% of the mentally ill women had been 
homeless immediately preceding their incarceration.169
LPS also produced an immediate increase in mentally ill persons in California’s 
jails and prisons. In 1972 Marc Abramson, a psychiatrist in San Mateo County, published 
data showing that the number of mentally ill persons entering the criminal justice system 
had doubled in the first year after LPS was implemented. According to Abramson: “As a 
result of LPS, mentally disordered persons are being increasingly subjected to arrest and 
criminal prosecution.”170 In adjacent Santa Clara County, a study showed that the jail 
population increased by 300% in the first four years after the closing of Agnews State 
Hospital, located in that county.171 A five-county study in 1975 also reported a 300% 
increase in severely mentally ill jail inmates over 10 years.172
________________________________________________________________________
167 CHASE, WHERE HAVE ALL THE PATIENTS GONE?
168 Rael Jean Isaac & Virginia Armat, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: HOW PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 
ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL 123 (1990).
169 H. Richard Lamb & Robert W. Grant, The Mentally Ill in an Urban County Jail, 39 ARCH. GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 17–22 (1982); H. Richard Lamb & Robert W. Grant, Mentally Ill Women in a County Jail 40 
ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 363–68 (1983).
170 Marc F. Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior: Possible Side-Effect of 
a New Mental Health Law 23 HOSP. COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 101–105 (1972) (hereinafter ABRAMSON, 
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MENTALLY DISORDERED BEHAVIOR). 
171 Linda A. Teplin, The Criminalization of the Mentally Ill: Speculation in Search of Data 94 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 54–67 (1983), quoting a 1973 study. By 1973, it was widely accepted that the discharge of 
patients from the California state psychiatric hospitals was directly related to the increasing number of 
mentally ill being seen in California’s jails. One study noted that law enforcement officers were seeing “a 
great increase in the number of former mental patients.” Because the patients could not be rehospitalized, 
62
By 1981, twelve years after LPS had been implemented, the problem of an 
explosive increase in mentally ill persons in California’s jails and prisons had been 
clearly documented. A study of almost 500 mentally ill individuals who had been arrested 
reported that “at the time of arrest, 94 percent were not involved in any outpatient 
program.”173 A newspaper report, headlined “The Crime of Mental Health,” noted: “Jails 
have replaced state mental hospitals as the new asylums for the insane. Reforms which 
released mental patients from state hospitals unexpectedly stuck them on a merry-go-
round of streets, cops, courts and jails.” The reporter described mentally ill inmates in the 
county jail such as those “who try to escape by smearing themselves with their own feces 
and flushing themselves down the toilet.”174 By 1991, the Los Angeles County Jail had 
become de facto “the largest mental institution in the United States” because of the large 
number of mentally ill individuals among its 24,000 inmates.175
In 1972, in the first published evaluation of the effects of LPS on the criminal
justice system, Marc Abramson had observed: “It would indeed be ironic if the Magna 
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Carta of the mentally ill in California led to their criminal stigmatization and 
incarceration in jails and prisons, where little or no mental health treatment is 
provided.”176 Within a decade, it was clear that Abramson’s prophecy had come to pass.
An increase in violent behavior by mentally ill persons who were not receiving 
treatment was yet another unintended consequence of the LPS Act. This was politically 
sensitive, since the issue of possible violent behavior by mentally ill persons had been 
specifically raised several times during public hearings prior to passage of the LPS 
legislation.
The first suggestion that violent behavior by mentally ill persons might be 
increasing came from a 1973 study carried out by the California Department of Health. 
Among 6,623 individuals convicted of murder, manslaughter, or felony assault during 
1971, 760 of them (12%) had previously been in a state psychiatric hospital or treated in 
a community mental health program. The rate of such crimes in the general population 
for individuals ages 16 and over was 0.47 per 1000; for those treated in a community 
mental health program, 2.88 per 1000; and for those treated in a state hospital 3.49 per 
1000.177 By one account, in the first four years following passage of LPS, “At least 72 . . . 
murders, suicides and ‘unfortunate accidents’ have directly involved former patients or 
those who tried unsuccessfully to get psychiatric care.”178
Many of the homicide cases were high-profile, such as Charles Soper, who 
murdered his wife and three of his five children, and Mary Maloney, who “decapitated 
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her infant daughter and year-old son.”179 Santa Cruz County alone had twenty-eight 
murders committed by severely psychiatrically ill individuals between 1970 and 1973. 
John Frazier, for example, killed a prominent surgeon and four members of his family on 
October 19, 1970; Frazier had paranoid schizophrenia, and his “wife and mother [had] 
tried desperately to obtain psychiatric treatment for him.”180 Herbert Mullin, also 
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, killed thirteen persons between October 1972 and 
February 1973. Mullin had been hospitalized and prematurely released five times. At the 
termination of Mullin’s trial, the foreman of the jury on the case wrote an open letter to 
then Governor Ronald Reagan:
Five times prior to Mr. Mullin’s arrest he was entered into mental 
facilities. At least twice it was determined that his illness could cause 
danger to lives of human beings. . . . According to testimony at this trial, 
Herb Mullin could and did respond favorably to treatment of his mental 
illness. Yet, the laws of this state certainly prohibit officials from forcing 
continued treatment of his illness, and I have the impression that they, as 
a matter of fact, discourage continued treatment by state and county 
institutions. . . . [My] convictions [are] that the laws surrounding mental 
illness in the State of California are wrong, wrong, wrong.”181
The definitive study on the effects of LPS on violent behavior by mentally ill 
persons was carried out by Larry Sosowsky at the University of California in Berkeley. 
He compared the arrest rates for all hospitalized mentally ill persons from San Mateo 
County for the three-and-a-half-year period before implementation of LPS and the four-
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and-a-half-year period following its implementation. He divided crimes into violent 
offenses causing bodily harm (e.g., murder, assault, rape), violent offenses with the 
potential for harm (e.g., robbery, possession of weapons, arson), and nonviolent crimes 
(e.g., public intoxication, possession of drugs, petty theft).
The results of the study showed clearly that limiting commitment of mental 
patients under LPS had increased crime. Comparing the pre-LPS to the post-LPS periods, 
Sosowsky reported that violent offenses causing bodily harm increased three and a half 
times; violent offenses with the potential for harm, one and a half times; and nonviolent 
crimes, three times. He concluded that changes in hospital admission and discharge 
policies, such as LPS brought about, “may well incur a heretofor unassessed social cost—
more crime and violence in the nation’s communities.”182
By 1975 it had also become clear that the transfer of clinical care from the state
psychiatric hospitals to the newly funded community mental health clinics had been a 
failure. As envisioned by the architects of LPS, patients who were being discharged from 
the hospitals were supposed to get follow-up outpatient care at the clinics. As noted by 
Eugene Bardach in his book on the implementation of LPS, the community mental health 
clinics “did relatively little to help the chronically mentally ill, even those who were 
released from the state hospitals in the great wave of discharges following LPS.”183 In 
one study, only 41% of the patients discharged from Napa State Hospital had received 
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follow-up psychiatric care in the community.184 Thus, it is not surprising that many of 
them ended up homeless, incarcerated, or incarcerated for violent acts.
V. The Lessard Decision: Wisconsin, 1972
On October 29, 1971, Ms. Alberta Lessard was picked up at her apartment in 
West Allis, Wisconsin, by two police officers and involuntarily committed to the 
Milwaukee Mental Health Center for examination. This was the third time that day that 
police had been called to her apartment. She was said to have been “running up and down 
the apartment aisle on the second floor banging on doors and shouting that the 
communists were taking over the country that night” and “threatening to jump off the 
second floor window ledge.”185
A preliminary psychiatric evaluation found that Ms. Lessard was suffering from 
paranoid schizophrenia and in need of treatment. Ms. Lessard retained counsel through 
the Milwaukee Legal Services, which filed a class action suit on her behalf and on behalf 
of “and all other persons 18 years of age and older who are being held involuntarily 
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pursuant to any emergency, temporary or permanent commitment provision of the 
Wisconsin involuntary commitment statute.”186
On October 18, 1972, a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court declared 
Wisconsin’s existing civil commitment statute unconstitutional and handed down a 
decision granting most of the provisions sought by the plaintiffs. The case was appealed 
and ultimately made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which vacated and remanded it 
in 1974 and 1975.187 In 1975, the Wisconsin Legislature then passed a law implementing 
the provisions of the Lessard decision.
The three-judge panel reasoned, as summarized by one observer, that “under the 
due-process provisions of the Constitution persons facing involuntary civil commitment 
are guaranteed the full array of procedural safeguards formerly guaranteed only to 
individuals charged with a crime.”188 These procedural safeguards included the right to 
an initial hearing within 48 hours; the right to a full hearing within two weeks; the right 
to trial by jury; the right to have the assistance of counsel; the right to be warned by the 
examining psychiatrist “that statement [sic] he may make may be basis for commitment, 
and that he does not have to speak to psychiatrist”;189 no admission of hearsay evidence; 
proof of mental illness “beyond a reasonable doubt”; a strict standard of immediate 
dangerousness as the only grounds for commitment; and the use of “involuntary 
hospitalization only as a last resort”190 after all alternatives to inpatient commitment have 
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been investigated and ruled out. The procedural safeguards in the Lessard decision 
became known among legal advocates as “the ten commandments for the mentally ill.”191
From the viewpoint of psychiatric professionals, three aspects of the Lessard
decision were especially problematic. Having to warn patients that anything they say can 
be used against them is antithetical to the traditional doctor-patient relationship; if 
patients choose to remain silent, psychiatric examinations are impossible. Proof of 
dangerousness “beyond a reasonable doubt” is much more difficult to achieve than “clear 
and convincing evidence” or the “preponderance of evidence,” the standards of proof that 
had traditionally been used. Finally, the criteria for dangerousness deemed necessary to 
permit involuntary commitment were defined so strictly that the criteria would be 
extremely difficult to meet; the Lessard decision said that “the state must bear the burden 
of proving that there is an extreme likelihood that if the person is not confined he will do 
immediate harm to himself or others . . . and dangerousness is based upon a finding of a 
recent overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to oneself or another” (emphases 
added).192 Because of this provision, the Lessard decision was called “the first landmark 
case dealing with the concept of dangerousness . . . a high-water mark in ‘dangerousness’ 
law.”193
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A. Assumptions Regarding the Causes of Psychiatric Disorders
Among the sources cited in support of their ruling, the three judges who rendered 
the Lessard decision identified the statements by Bruce J. Ennis and Dr. Thomas S. 
Szasz, both of whom had testified at Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the 
Mentally Ill before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. Robert H. 
Blondis, one of the lawyers who represented Ms. Lessard and submitted the original 
brief, said in an interview that his views on psychiatric disorders had also been strongly 
influenced by Dr. Szasz’s books The Myth of Mental Illness (1961) and Law, Liberty and 
Psychiatry (1963); “that is where I was coming from,” Blondis recalled. He said that he 
had also been influenced by William Ryan’s Blaming the Victim (1971).194
In their ruling, the three-judge panel reflected the views of Ennis, Szasz, and 
Ryan. Ennis, the director of the New York Civil Liberties Union Mental Illness Litigation 
Project, had testified that “mental illness” is “at most a ‘theory’ to explain unconventional 
conduct or belief. As such, its boundaries expand or contract according to the life styles 
and value judgments of the theorist.”195 Szasz had explicitly stated that mental illnesses 
do not exist “as scientific entities.”196 Ryan had similarly written that the state psychiatric 
hospital patient populations consisted mostly of “the poor, the aged, the drunk and the 
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inept petty criminal.”197 Thus, in their ruling the judges noted: “Obviously, the definition 
of mental illness is left largely to the user and is dependent upon the norms of adjustment 
that he employs. . . . The diagnostician has the ability to shoehorn into the mentally 
diseased class almost any person he wishes, for whatever reason, to put there.”198 This 
view suggests that there are no scientific definitions or boundaries for psychiatric 
disorders but rather that they are simply relative categories of behavior.
In their ruling, the three-judge panel included two other statements that reflected 
their assumptions regarding the causes of psychiatric disorders. Quoting from the 1970 
Senate hearings, the judges noted that “often it is the drugs (i.e., medications) themselves 
which are responsible for ‘crazy’ behavior.” And quoting Bruce Ennis’s Senate 
testimony, they noted that there is “substantial evidence that any lengthy hospitalization, 
particularly where it is involuntary, may greatly increase the symptoms of mental 
illness.”199 In this view, when symptoms of a psychiatric disorder are present, the 
symptoms may not signify a true disease but rather may be caused by medications being 
given to the person or by the effects of hospitalizing the person.
B. Assumptions Regarding Competence To Make Informed Treatment Decisions
The three-judge panel that rendered the Lessard decision clearly indicated their 
assumptions regarding the competence of individuals with psychiatric disorders to make 
informed treatment decisions: “Persons in need of hospitalization for mental illness 
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should be allowed choice of whether to undergo hospitalization and treatment or not 
unless the state can prove that the person is unable to make decision about hospitalization 
because of nature of illness.”200 The court did not further define what it meant by “unable 
to make decision” or how the state was supposed to establish this deficit. However, the 
testimony of Bruce Ennis in the 1969 Senate hearings, which was cited multiple times by 
the judges, included the following: “A patient suffering from cancer, heart disease, or 
pneumonia can’t be committed, even for his own welfare. Apparently, involuntary 
treatment of the mental patient is based on the assumption first, that he is incompetent to 
make a ‘rational’ choice between liberty and treatment, and second, that he would, if 
competent, choose treatment. There is not to my knowledge any evidence to support 
either of these assumptions.”201
Overall, Bruce Ennis appears to have had a substantial influence on the judges 
who rendered the Lessard decision. In 1969, Ennis had testified at the U.S. Senate 
hearings: “Commitment because of alleged danger to self or to others should require 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, based on a recent overt act or threat, that the person 
would, if at liberty, inflict substantial physical injury upon himself or others within the 
immediate future.”202 The 1972 Lessard decision included “beyond a reasonable doubt,” 
“a recent overt act,” “substantial harm to oneself or another,” and “immediate harm” as 
its standards for dangerousness.
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C. Effects of the Lessard Decision
In 1976, legal scholar Alan Stone noted that the provisions of the Lessard 
decision, if strictly followed, would “put a virtual end to involuntary confinement” of 
individuals with psychiatric disorders.203 For Bruce Ennis and his associates, this was 
exactly what they intended; Ennis wrote at the time that the ultimate goal of mental 
health laws should be “nothing less than the abolition of involuntary hospitalization.”204
An analysis of the Lessard decision published one year after it was handed down 
said that “the decision effectively obliterated a major portion of the Wisconsin civil 
commitment statute”205 by limiting the use of parens patriae as grounds for involuntary 
commitment and replacing it with dangerousness as the sole grounds. As summarized by 
Darold A. Treffert, a Wisconsin psychiatrist who has written extensively about the 
Lessard case: “Provisions for the state to use parens patriae powers in the absence of 
dangerousness narrowly defined were effectively abolished; the pendulum swung entirely 
to dangerousness in terms of imminent physical harm as the only authority on which the 
state could infringe on individual liberty.”206 The decision also guaranteed that 
individuals facing civil commitment would have many of the same procedural safeguards 
as are given to individuals charged under the criminal law.
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The Lessard decision had a major influence on courts in other states. Prior to the 
decision, according to one account, nine states used “dangerousness” as the sole criterion 
for involuntary psychiatric hospitalization, but by 1980, “every state had changed its 
statute to restrict hospitalization to persons who were dangerous to themselves or others 
. . . or had interpreted its preexisting statute in a way so as to save it from being found 
unconstitutional.”207 Many of the procedural safeguards included in the Lessard decision, 
such as the right to trail by jury, were also adopted by other states. Similarly, between 
1972 and 1980, 5 other states and federal courts copied the Lessard decision by adopting 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” as the standard by which dangerousness and mental illness 
should be judged; however, 14 other courts “rejected that standard as too demanding in 
the context of civil commitment.”208
Overall, the Lessard decision was a major victory for the movement to restrict 
involuntary commitment. As summarized in a 1975 overview of civil commitment laws: 
“Both courts and legislation are moving more towards the police power concept of 
‘dangerousness’ as a ground for commitment and away from the parens patriae concept 
of ‘unable to care for self’ or ‘in need of mental treatment,’ because a deprivation of 
liberty is a serious curtailment of personal rights and should only be imposed when 
absolutely necessary.”209
In Wisconsin, the implementation and effects of the Lessard decision varied 
widely from county to county. As described in a 1976 analysis: “Because many 
Wisconsin county judges disagreed with much of the Lessard decision, and because 
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much of the decision contained ambiguities, many of the fundamental Lessard 
requirements were given interpretations that were so broad that they were rendered 
meaningless.”210 There was a sharp decrease in involuntary admissions in most counties; 
for example, at the Milwaukee County Mental Health Center, involuntary admissions 
decreased by more than half from immediately prior to the Lessard decision to 
immediately after it.211 At the same time, there was a sharp increase in criminal 
commitments of individuals with serious psychiatric disorders to the three state 
psychiatric hospital;212 bringing criminal charges against individuals with severe 
psychiatric disorders is one of the only ways to get such individuals hospitalized when 
civil commitment is no longer possible.
In Wisconsin counties in which the Lessard court definition of dangerousness was 
strictly adhered to, it became almost impossible to get involuntary civil commitments for 
individuals with serious psychiatric disorders. Darold Treffert documented these 
difficulties in great detail, including, for example, the case of a man diagnosed with 
schizophrenia who was in jail, overtly psychotic, and observed to be eating his feces from 
the toilet bowl. When a psychiatrist recommended that he be committed to a psychiatric 
hospital for treatment, the following court discussion took place:
Public defender: “Doctor, would the eating of fecal material on 
one occasion by an individual pose a serious risk of harm to that person?
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Doctor: “It is certainly not edible material. . . . It contains 
elements that are considered harmful or unnecessary.”
Public defender: “But, doctor, you cannot state whether the 
consumption of such material on one occasion would invariably harm a 
person?
Doctor: “Certainly not on one occasion.”
The public defender then moved to dismiss the petition for commitment on the grounds 
that the patient did not meet the strict Lessard criteria for dangerousness. The judge 
agreed, and the man was released.213
The consequences of the Lessard decision can also be measured by its effects on 
the community. A few years after implementation of the decision, the governor of 
Wisconsin “became concerned about the number of obviously mentally ill persons on the 
streets of the capital who were wandering into the capital building and into his office.”214
As has happened in other states, the number of psychiatrically ill homeless individuals 
continued to steadily increase in Wisconsin so that in 2000, shelter workers in Milwaukee 
estimated “that half of the 2,000 or so who live on Milwaukee’s streets are chronically 
and persistently mentally ill.”215
Similarly, in 1981, the Milwaukee Sentinel carried a series of articles entitled 
“Mentally Ill Behind Bars,” detailing how mentally ill persons were being shunted to the 
criminal justice system since implementation of the Lessard decision.216 Increasingly, 
police realized that it was useless to try to get commitments for mentally ill individuals, 
so they arrested them instead.
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In Madison, Wisconsin, the most common charges brought against mentally ill 
persons who were arrested were “lewd and lascivious behavior (such as urinating on a 
street corner), defrauding an innkeeper (eating a meal, then not paying for it), disorderly 
conduct (such as being too loud), menacing panhandling, criminal damage to property, 
loitering or petty theft.”217 By 2000, two decades after implementation of the Lessard 
provisions, jail officials in Milwaukee claimed that “one-third of 2,500 inmates at the 
county jail and the House of Corrections are suffering from a major mental illness,”218
Following the Lessard decision, there also appeared to be an increase in suicides 
and violent acts by mentally ill individuals who were not being treated. Within three 
months following implementation of Lessard, three deaths had been directly attributed to 
the new law. Darold Treffert noted that “each of these patients needed commitment; none 
qualified,” and he eloquently referred to such deaths as “dying with one’s rights on.”219
Violent episodes involving mentally ill individuals continued to occur regularly in 
Wisconsin. Such episodes became especially common in Dane County, where the court 
was said to place “heavy emphasis on the Lessard commitment standard, requiring the 
defendant to be dangerous to himself or others.”220 In Madison, a community of 200,000, 
such violent episodes peaked in a 13-month period in 1988 and 1989 during which “six 
separate incidents resulted in four homicides, three suicides, seven victims wounded by 
gunshot, and one victim mauled by a polar bear.”221 The last occurred when a mentally ill 
man climbed into the den of the bear at the Madison zoo. Some observers attributed these 
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incidents to “unduly stringent interpretations and applications of Wisconsin’s civil 
commitment standards.”222 Responding to a public outcry following these incidents, the 
strict county criteria for commitment were relaxed, with a subsequent decrease in violent 
episodes.
Finally, what effect did the class-action Lessard decision have on Ms. Lessard 
herself? Prior to the onset of her illness and her involuntary hospitalization, Ms. Lessard 
had been a successful schoolteacher for 26 years and had also taught student teachers at 
Marquette University. After the Lessard decision, Ms. Lessard was unable to work and 
lived on Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). During the intervening years, 
according to her recollection, she was involuntarily hospitalized “13 or 14 times” but 
never took medications except when forced to do so during her brief hospitalizations.223
Ms. Lessard also acknowledged having been put in jail “maybe a dozen times” on 
what she called “trumped up charges.” On two or three occasions, she says, she was 
homeless, including two months of living on the streets of Milwaukee during the winter. 
During the years since the Lessard decision, Ms. Lessard has filed numerous suits against 
the government, including one seeking to declare “all elections from the time of Richard 
Nixon’s illegal.” That suit was dismissed with a comment by the judge that “it is clear 
from her complaint that the plaintiff wishes to challenge nearly every facet of government 
in existence today.”224 When Ms. Lessard was recently asked in an interview if she 
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believed that she had schizophrenia, she answered: “Absolutely not. I don’t have any of 
the symptoms.”225
VI. Implications of the New Biology for Laws Governing
Involuntary Commitment and Treatment:
Principles for Consideration for the Future 
Since the 1960s, there have been profound changes in state mental health laws, 
especially those concerning the involuntary commitment and treatment of patients. We 
have examined in detail two such laws, the 1969 Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act in 
California and the 1972 Lessard decision, which led, after several overturnings, to new 
legislation in Wisconsin. LPS and Lessard are perhaps the best-known statute and 
decision in civil commitment law, particularly for their era. We have argued that their 
assumptions about mental illness, and the brain, are seriously mistaken. Possibly because 
of their influence, they are representative of other statutes and caselaw that also make 
seriously inaccurate assumptions. 
In both the LPS legislation and the Lessard decision, the legal changes were 
predicated on assumptions regarding the probable causes of psychiatric disorders and the 
competence of individuals who have been diagnosed with a severe psychiatric disorder to 
make informed treatment decisions. We have examined these assumptions in detail, using 
schizophrenia as the most common form, and representative example, of severe 
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psychiatric disorders. Although scientific studies of bipolar disorder (manic-depressive 
illness) and major depression with psychotic features are less abundant than those of 
schizophrenia, those that do exist suggest that our conclusions probably apply to those 
disorders as well.226 However, the conclusions appear not to be applicable to other 
psychiatric disorders in which anosognosia is not a clinical feature.
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Regarding the causes of schizophrenia, we found that the architects of both LPS 
and the Lessard decision were understandably influenced by the prevailing beliefs of that
era. They assumed that schizophrenia was a relative concept, a label that could be applied 
arbitrarily and for which there was no scientific basis. The framers of LPS wrote that 
“madness, like beauty, may exist in the eye of the beholder.”227 The three-judge panel 
that handed down the Lessard decision wrote that “the definition of mental illness is left 
largely to the user and is dependent upon the norms of adjustment that he employs.”228
Although every term has play around the edges—what H. L. A. Hart called open texture--
these characterizations of mental illness are grossly exaggerated.229 Consistent with the 
belief that definitions of mental illness were arbitrary was the belief that state psychiatric 
hospitals were “warehouses for the idiosyncratic, the aged, the senile, the odd, the 
different,” in the words of one of the sponsors of LPS,230 or “the poor, the aged, the drunk 
and the inept petty criminal,” in the words of a writer who influenced the Lessard 
decision.231
As we have demonstrated in part II, these assumptions about the causes of 
schizophrenia are now known to be erroneous. Literally hundreds of studies have shown 
that schizophrenia is a brain disease with measurable changes in brain structure and 
function, and that these changes are not caused by medications being used to treat it. In 
this sense, schizophrenia is in the same category of conditions as Alzheimer’s disease, 
example is Percy Knauth’s A SEASON IN HELL 35 (1975), in which he says: “More realistically, I 
understood that the only tool I could fight with—my mind—was the very part of me that was affected.”
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Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclerosis, and other disorders known to be diseases of the 
brain but whose precise causes are not yet known. 
The architects of both LPS and the Lessard decision also assumed that individuals 
with serious mental illnesses were competent to make informed treatment decisions. One 
of the sponsors of LPS wrote that it was “indefensible” to presume “that a mentally ill 
individual will not admit to being ‘sick’ and will not accept recommended treatment.”232
Similarly, Bruce Ennis, who strongly influenced the Lessard decision, wrote that “there is 
not to my knowledge any evidence to support” the assumption that “the mental patient 
. . . is incompetent to make a ‘rational’ choice between liberty or treatment.”233 Thus, 
under LPS, “citizens will be free to decide whether they wish to enter or leave the 
hospitals,” and under the Lessard decision, “persons in need of hospitalization for mental 
illness should be allowed choice of whether to undergo hospitalization and treatment 
. . .”
234
 As we have demonstrated in part III, these assumptions about the competence of 
individuals with severe psychiatric disorders to make informed treatment decisions are, in 
many cases, wrong. Approximately half of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorder have anosognosia and are partially or completely unaware of their 
illness. Many of these individuals are not competent to make rational treatment decisions 
because they do not believe there is anything wrong with them or that they need 
treatment.235 Anosognosia is a biologically-based deficit, and individuals with severe 
psychiatric disorders who suffer from anosognosia are similar to individuals with 
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Alzheimer’s disease, Huntington’s disease, or strokes. They are similar in the legally and 
morally relevant respects. Actions by such individuals that are consequences of their 
anosognosia must be seen as symptoms of an illness, and not as free, informed choices.
Because current scientific knowledge suggests that approximately half of persons 
with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder lack insight into their illness and need for 
treatment, we should inquire as to which, if any, consequences follow for mental health 
law from these facts. Consistent with the rest of this Article, we will describe the 
consequences for civil commitment. However, similar conclusions could be drawn for 
coerced treatment.
There are two kinds of jurisdictions. The first requires competence for 
commitment; the second does not. This much follows as a matter of logic. Approximately 
ten jurisdictions have some kind of incapacity prerequisite for commitment explicitly in 
their statutory criteria. 236 Careful analysis reveals that some of those requirements are not 
really a form of incapacity.237 Therefore, it might appear that fewer than ten jurisdictions 
require incapacity, but that conclusion would be premature. Some jurisdictions have 
incapacity as a result of judicial decisions, whereas other jurisdictions sneak incapacity in 
by the back door.238 Without a thorough, time-consuming and probably unrewarding 
investigation, it is unclear how many jurisdictions require incapacity. 
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236 E.g., AL STAT Sec. 22-52-10.2 iii; FL. STAT Sec. 394.467 1. (a) & (b).; IOWA CODE Sec. 229.1(15). 
237
 States that have a criterion in the vicinity of incapacity for commitment, but not quite incapacity, 
include Arizona and Colorado. AZ. STAT. 36-533 (3) (“That the patient is unwilling to accept or incapable 
of accepting treatment voluntarily;”) (The statute does not contemplate the prospect that the patient 
reasonably rejects treatment and is capable of doing so); In re Pima County, 817P.2d.945(Ariz. App.1991) 
(Failure to recognize the benefits of treatment serving as a proxy for incapacity); CO. STAT 27-10-
109(b)(Respondent rejects treatment after having been advised of its availability or is likely not to remain 
in a voluntary treatment program as a proxy for incapacity).
238
 For example, Wisconsin’s Fifth Standard for dangerousness, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 51.20(13)(a)3 
(2001), recently held constitutional by the Wisconsin supreme court, In re Dennis H, sneaks in an 
incapacity requirement as part of the definition of dangerousness.
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Whatever the distribution, in those jurisdictions that require incapacity, 
anosognosia is evidence of legally relevant lack of insight, which is itself evidence of 
incapacity. Many legal theorists have argued that lack of insight is either nearly sufficient 
for incapacity, or else justifies commitment and coerced treatment as well or better than 
incapacity.239 Because approximately half of persons with schizophrenia or bipolar 
disorder have substantial or severe lack of insight, the strong presumption of capacity in 
doctrine and practice in California under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, and in 
Wisconsin under the Lessard decision, is misguided and should be discarded in 
consequence of advances in scientific knowledge. So too should jurisdictions with strong 
presumptions that follow California or Wisconsin, or that have independent grounds for a 
strong presumption, discard those presumptions.
We cannot overemphasize the importance of psychiatrists, lawyers, and courts 
paying greater attention to lack of insight. Still, we will not move too far in the opposite 
direction. We wish to replace dogmatism with reason, not with an opposing dogmatism. 
Our view is that lack of insight is substantial evidence of incapacity that should lead to 
further inquiry, not that it is conclusive. 
If, because you lack insight, you irrationally believe that you are not mentally ill, 
do not have pathological symptoms, and do not need treatment, it may nonetheless seem 
natural from your perspective to reject treatment. But those beliefs block your ability to 
make an informed, free, capable decision because the existence of pathological 
symptoms, illness, and need for treatment are crucial facts necessary for informed 
________________________________________________________________________
239 KRESS, WHY LACK OF INSIGHT SHOULD HAVE A CENTRAL PLACE 257; Elyn R. Saks & Dilip V. 
Jeste, Capacity To Consent to or Refuse Treatment and/or Research: Theoretical Considerations, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE (forthcoming).
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decision making. A rational inference from seriously unjustified beliefs is generally not a 
capable decision, or a capable mental health treatment decision.240
Perhaps surprisingly, many individuals who lack insight, or the capacity to make 
mental health treatment decisions nonetheless accept treatment. There is no reason to 
waste government resources overseeing such individuals even if they meet the criteria for 
commitment. We have better ways to employ our scarce resources. 
In summary, in jurisdictions that require incapacity for commitment, recent 
advances in our understanding of lack of insight suggest that there should be no strong 
presumption of capacity in doctrine or practice. Rather, it is likely, but not certain, that 
most persons who lack insight lack capacity. Moreover, most, but not all persons who 
lack insight will refuse treatment241; if there were to be any presumption, it should be in 
the other direction. But it is probably better to have no presumption, and put the State to 
its proof. Our most important point, however, is that all actors in the commitment and 
coerced treatment system should pay more attention to anosognosia and its consequences.
Both in jurisdictions that require incapacity for commitment, and those that do 
not, lack of insight is evidence, but not conclusive evidence, for both mental illness and 
dangerousness, the two nearly universal requirements for civil commitment by statute in 
American jurisdictions,242 and perhaps nearly all foreign jurisdictions as well. Most 
commentators believe the two are Constitutionally required by Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 
U.S. 71(1992),243 but a careful analysis rejects that interpretation.244 In those jurisdictions 
________________________________________________________________________
240
 Elyn Saks, Competency To Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C.L. Rev. 945 (1991).
241 TORREY, THE RELATIONSHIP OF INSIGHT TO VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND STIGMA 243, 245 (and 
sources cited therein).
242 But see South Carolina Stat. Sec. 44-17-580 (mental illness and either incapacity or 
dangerousness).
243 See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT, 289–91 (1977) 
(hereinafter BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT.
85
that do not require incapacity for commitment, as well as those that do, lack of insight is 
still relevant to proof of mental illness and dangerousness.
There are two possible routes by which lack of insight could help prove mental 
illness or more severe mental illness. First, there might be a correlation, although 
certainly not direct, between severity of lack of insight and severity of illness. More 
likely, there are known correlations between lack of insight, and failure to accept 
treatment. Additionally, failure to accept treatment is correlated with more severe illness. 
Finally, more severe illness is correlated with greater dangerousness and violence. Thus, 
lack of insight is evidence of greater mental illness and greater dangerousness. It is 
relevant to commitment even in jurisdictions that do not require competence for 
commitment. 245
Our normative consideration is that lack of insight, or lack of appreciation, better 
justifies coerced treatment than incapacity read as lack of practical reasoning ability, that 
is, lack of ability to rationally choose from among possible mental health treatments, 
including deciding to accept none. This holds for two reasons. First, it is unclear how so 
244 In Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 73 (1992), language in the plurality opinion asserts that the 
Constitution requires both mental illness and dangerousness, but the Court's statements about 
dangerousness are both dicta and based upon a misunderstanding of the Court's prior opinions in Jones v. 
United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) and O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Whether substantive 
due process requires dangerousness was not before the Court. Moreover, as Justice Thomas noted in his 
dissent, Jones held that mental illness and dangerousness was constitutionally sufficient for commitment, 
whereas the plurality of the Court misstated Jones as holding that mental illness and dangerousness were 
necessary for a commitment that is constitutional. Id. at 120. More importantly, the plurality had only four 
votes. Justice O'Connor made it clear that her fifth and deciding vote was premised upon the opinion 
applying only to Louisiana's criminal commitment statute, and does not apply to other more narrowly 
drawn criminal commitment statutes. A fortiori, the opinion does not apply to civil commitment statutes, 
including Wisconsin' s Fifth Standard: "I write separately, however, to emphasize that the Court's opinion 
addresses only the specific statutory scheme before us, which broadly permits indefinite confinement of 
sane insanity acquittees in psychiatric facilities." Id. at 86–87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
Moreover, Justice O'Connor reiterated that Jones had noted that psychiatry is an inexact science, 
and that for that reason, "'courts should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments' about 
the relationship between dangerous behavior and mental illness," such as those embodied in Wisconsin's 
Fifth Standard. Id. at 87 (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 364, 365 & n.13).
245 TORREY, THE RELATIONSHIP OF INSIGHT TO VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND STIGMA 243.
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many courts and commentators could have thought that inability to reason by a method 
that has a good chance of picking the best, or a good treatment, justifies paternalistic 
government intervention. That is to take a socialsciencecentric perspective. It is to force 
cost-benefit rationality upon others, on pain of denominating them incapable. That 
persons with mental illness do not make decisions as the advocates of practical reason 
would recommend does not justify coercing those individuals. On the other hand, 
individuals who don’t realize that they are ill, or how ill they are, or that they need 
treatment—who lack insight—cannot make free and informed decisions. The inability to 
make free and informed decisions has justified state paternalism in both legal doctrine 
and philosophical writings for centuries. 
Moreover, because lack of insight is easier to determine than inability to 
rationally choose—indeed, the concept of rationality itself is controversial—intervening 
on the basis of lack of insight results in the law being more reliable and certain. When the 
law is more reliable and certain, persons have more liberty because they know better 
where their liberty ends and the law’s coercion begins. Moreover, where the law is more 
certain, persons are treated alike when appropriate more often, and the law treats its 
subjects more frequently with equal concern and respect. Finally, by basing coercion on 
lack of autonomy, rather than lack of practical reasoning ability, the state treats its 
citizens more justly, and also more equally. We do not want to follow Vince Lombardi, 
who said, “I treat all my players equally. Like dogs!” 246
Given the current state of knowledge regarding the causes of severe psychiatric 
disorders and the competence of some individuals affected by these disorders, we might 
________________________________________________________________________
246 KRESS, WHY LACK OF INSIGHT SHOULD HAVE A CENTRAL PLACE) 257.
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also ask what principles should be considered in framing future legislation? The 
following three principles should be considered:
A. Individuals with schizophrenia and other severe psychiatric disorders should be 
regarded as equal to individuals with other chronic brain disorders
The category of “psychiatric disorders,” as defined by the American Psychiatric 
Association, includes an extremely wide and diverse group of behaviors. It is now clear 
that a subset of these that includes schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression 
consists of biologically-based brain diseases. As such, these disorders should be treated 
legislatively in the same manner as other brain diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease, 
Parkinson’s disease, and multiple sclerosis. Thus, there should be no discrimination 
against individuals with these psychiatric disorders for public programs such as Medicaid 
or Medicare coverage or for private programs such as medical insurance coverage. 
Insofar as discrimination exists, it should be corrected by legislation.
B. An assessment for anosognosia should be routinely included in all determinations 
of competency
Since studies have clearly demonstrated that many individuals with severe 
psychiatric disorder have anosognosia, its assessment should be included in all 
competency determinations. As noted in section III, there are now a variety of 
anosognosia assessment scales that can be used for this purpose.
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It is important to assess anosognosia, because it has been shown in individuals 
with schizophrenia to be the single most important determinant of medication 
noncompliance. Medication noncompliance, in turn, is a major determinant of relapses, 
readmissions to hospitals, homelessness, incarcerations, and violent behavior among 
individuals with schizophrenia. Thus, for an individual with schizophrenia who has a 
history of incarceration or violence, an assessment of anosognosia would be helpful to 
judicial authorities in recommending the conditions under which the person should be 
allowed to live in the community.247
C. Specific Proposals: Provision for assisted treatment should be available in all 
states and used when necessary
Since medication compliance is critical for successful community living for many 
individuals with severe psychiatric disorders, and since individuals with anosognosia are 
less likely to take medication because they do not believe they are ill, assisted treatment 
should be available and used when necessary. Many forms of assisted treatment are 
available, all of which involve some degree of coercion. These include representative 
payeeship, conditional release, outpatient commitment, conservatorships and 
guardianships.
Representative payeeship as a form of assisted treatment occurs when another 
individual, assigned by the court, is the recipient of the affected individual’s SSI, SSDI, 
VA disability check, or other financial support and when medication compliance is a 
condition for releasing the funds. For individuals with severe psychiatric disorders, 
________________________________________________________________________
247 TORREY, THE RELATIONSHIP OF INSIGHT TO VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND STIGMA 243.
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studies have shown representative payeeship to be effective in reducing rehospitalization, 
substance abuse, and homelessness.248
Conditional release occurs when patients who have been legally committed to a 
hospital are released on the condition that they follow treatment instructions, including 
taking medication when indicated. Violation of the condition may result in involuntary 
rehospitalization, or a rehearing on whether rehospitalization is proper. Forty states have 
laws permitting conditional release,249 but it is used primarily for criminally committed 
patients. In most states, the director of the state psychiatric hospital, or her agent, has the 
authority to issue conditional releases without asking permission of the court.250 In New 
Hampshire the permission has also been legally delegated to the directors of state-owned 
community mental health centers. New Hampshire has deployed conditional release 
particularly widely in civil cases. In these circumstances, conditional release decreases 
violence.251 Among forensic patients, conditional release has been shown in studies in 
Oregon and other states to be highly effective in reducing future criminal behavior.252
________________________________________________________________________
248 Studies have shown that using a representative payee reduces hospitalization days, substance 
abuse, and days spent homeless; see Daniel J. Luchins et al., An Agency-based Representative Payee 
Program and Improved Community Tenure of Persons with Mental Illness, 49 PSYCHIATR. SERV. 1218–22 
(1998), Daniel J. Luchins et al., Representative Payeeship and Mental Illness: A Review, 30 ADM. POLICY 
MENT. HEALTH 341–53 (2003), Robert Rosenheck et al., Impact of Representative Payees on Substance 
Use among Homeless Persons with Serious Mental Illness and Substance Abuse, 48 PSYCHIATR. SERV. 
800–806 (1997), and M.R. Stoner, Money Management Services for the Homeless Mentally Ill, 40 HOSP. 
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 751–53 (1989). In a U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruling, the court ruled 
that a man with epilepsy and borderline mental retardation was not entitled to SSDI benefits unless he 
demonstrated compliance with his anti-epileptic medication (Brown v. Bowen, 845 F2d 1211, 3rd Circuit, 
1988).
249 Christopher Slobogin, Involuntary Community Treatment of People Who Are Violent and 
Mentally Ill: A Legal Analysis, 45 HOSP. COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 685–89 (1994).
250 See, e.g., IOWA CODE Sec. 229.14(2003); In Re Melodie L.,591 N.W.2d 4,9 (Iowa 1999).
251 Christopher O’Keefe et al., Treatment Outcomes for Severely Mentally Ill Patients on Conditional 
Discharge to Community-based Treatment, 185 J. NERV. MENT. DIS. 409 (1997).
252 Joseph D. Bloom et al., Monitored Conditional Release of Persons Found Not Guilty by Reason of 
Insanity, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 444–48 (1991); Joseph D. Bloom et al., Evaluation and Treatment of 
Insanity Acquittees in the Community, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 231–44 (1986).
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Outpatient commitment occurs when a court orders a patient to comply with 
treatment, usually including medication, as a condition for living in the community. 
Violation of an outpatient commitment order can result in involuntary inpatient 
commitment, or rehearing and involuntary hospitalization. Schopp has developed a 
particularly powerful argument why a failure to comply with an outpatient order may 
justify inpatient commitment. He argues that under the least restrictive alternative 
doctrine failure to comply with the outpatient commitment order may demonstrate that 
the respondent is incapable of living safely as an outpatient.253 Some form of outpatient 
commitment is available in forty-two states but is little used in most of them.254 Multiple 
studies have demonstrated that outpatient commitment for individuals with severe 
psychiatric disorders is effective in increasing treatment compliance and in decreasing 
psychiatric readmissions, episodes of violence, and arrests and incarcerations.255
________________________________________________________________________
253 Robert F. Schopp, Outpatient Civil Commitment: A Dangerous Charade or a Component of a 
Comprehensive Institution of Civil Commitment?,9 PSYCHOLOGY, PUB. POL,Y & L. 33 (2003). 
254 The states for which no outpatient statute exists are Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Tennessee.
255 Outpatient commitment has been shown to be effective as a form of assisted treatment in 
increasing treatment compliance. In North Carolina, only 30% of patients on outpatient commitment 
refused medication during a six-month period compared to 66% of patients not on outpatient commitment; 
see Virginia Hiday & Teresa L. Scheid-Cook, The North Carolina Experience with Outpatient 
Commitment: A Critical Appraisal, 10 INT. J. LAW PSYCHIATRY 215–32 (1987). A more recent North 
Carolina study showed similar effectiveness; see Marvin S. Swartz et al., Effects of Involuntary Outpatient 
Commitment and Depot Antipsychotics on Treatment Adherence in Persons with Severe Mental Illness, 189 
J. NERV. MENT. DIS. 583–92 (2001). In Ohio, outpatient commitment increased patients’ compliance with 
outpatient psychiatric appointments from 5.7 to 13.0 per year and with attendance at day treatment sessions 
from 23 to 60 per year; see Mark R. Munetz et al., The Effectiveness of Outpatient Civil Commitment, 47 
PSYCHIATR. SERV. 1251–53 (1996) (hereinafter MUNETZ, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUTPATIENT CIVIL 
COMMITMENT). In Arizona, among patients who had been outpatient committed, “71 percent of the patients 
voluntarily maintained treatment contacts six months after their orders expired” compared to “almost no 
patients” who had not been put on outpatient commitment; see Robert A. Van Putten et al., Involuntary 
Outpatient Commitment in Arizona: A Retrospective Study, 39 HOSP. COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 953–58 
(1988). And in Iowa, “it appears as though outpatient commitment promotes treatment compliance in about 
80 percent of patients while they are on outpatient commitment. After commitment is terminated about 
three-quarters of that group remain in treatment on a voluntary basis”; see Barbara M. Rohland, THE ROLE 
OF OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PERSONS WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA (1998) (hereinafter 
ROHLAND, THE ROLE OF OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT). The effectiveness of outpatient commitment in 
decreasing hospital admissions has been clearly established. In Washington, D.C., admissions decreased 
from 1.81 per year to 0.95 per year before and after outpatient commitment; see Guido Zanni & Leslie 
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Conservatorships or guardianships occur when an individual is assigned by the 
court to make decisions for another person who is considered not to be competent. In the 
United States, they are widely used for individuals who have moderate or severe mental 
retardation and for individuals with neurological conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease. 
Conservatorships and guardianships are theoretically available in most states for 
individuals with severe psychiatric disorders but have been little used except in 
California.
D. Moral Justification for the Significance of Anosognosia and for the 
Existence of Assisted Treatment
These various forms of assistance have been shown to reduce violence, arrests, 
incarceration, treatment costs from inpatient commitment, homelessness, and substance 
abuse, although not each form of assistance has yet been demonstrated by empirical 
deVeau, Inpatient Stays Before and After Outpatient Commitment 37 HOSP. COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 
941–42 (1986). Similarly, in Ohio the decrease was from 1.5 to 0.4 (MUNETZ, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
OUTPATIENT CIVIL COMMITMENT), and in Iowa from 1.3 to 0.3 (ROHLAND, THE ROLE OF OUTPATIENT 
COMMITMENT). In North Carolina, admissions for patients on outpatient commitment decreased from 3.7 to 
0.7 per 1,000 days; see Gustavo Fernandez & Sylvia Nygard, Impact of Involuntary Outpatient 
Commitment on the Revolving-Door Syndrome in North Carolina, 41 HOSP. COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 
1001–1004 (1990). In New York, the reduction in readmissions was from 87% to 20%; see New York State 
Office of Mental Health, KENDRA’S LAW: AN INTERIM REPORT ON THE STATUS OF ASSISTED OUTPATIENT 
TREATMENT (2003) (hereinafter KENDRA’S LAW: AN INTERIM REPORT). The only study that failed to find 
outpatient commitment effective in significantly reducing admissions was a Tennessee study. However, in 
that study, it was evident that “outpatient clinics are not vigorously enforcing the law” and so nonadherence 
had no consequences; see Ben Bursten, Posthospital Mandatory Outpatient Treatment, 143 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1255–58 (1986). Outpatient commitment, when extended for more than six months, has also 
been shown to decrease episodes of violence by 40% in a study in North Carolina; see Jeffrey W. Swanson 
et al., Involuntary Out-Patient Commitment and Reduction of Violent Behaviour in Persons with Severe 
Mental Illness, 176 BR. J. PSYCHIATRY 324–31 (2000). The North Carolina study also showed that 
outpatient commitment reduced arrests from 45% to 12%; see Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Can Involuntary 
Outpatient Commitment Reduce Arrests among Persons with Severe Mental Illness?, 28 CRIM. JUSTICE 
BEHAV. 156–89 (2001). Finally, in a study in New York, outpatient commitment was shown to reduce the 
incidence of arrests from 30% to 5% and to reduce the incidence of incarceration from 21% to 3% 
(KENDRA’S LAW: AN INTERIM REPORT).
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studies to reduce each of these social problems. Despite these considerable virtues, some 
will object that coercion violates autonomy rights and therefore cannot be justified.
We will respond to this concern by distinguishing three circumstances. First, we 
will consider individuals who are dangerous to others. Second, we will examine 
individuals who lack the relevant capacity. Our third, and most controversial claim, 
considers individuals who are partly, but not completely, incapacitated. Most of these 
individuals, if dangerous, will be mostly dangerous to self. Because our position in this 
area is the most novel and controversial of these three circumstances, we will examine it 
at greater length.
Nearly every current scholar maintains that dangerousness to others, in 
combination with mental illness, and perhaps beneficial treatment, justifies coercive 
commitment.256 The overwhelming majority of states agree. Society has also found 
danger to others from disease and illness sufficient to justify coercive reductions in 
liberty. For example, many states commit individuals with tuberculosis, especially if they 
are incapable of following, or fail to follow, prescribed treatment regimens.257 When we 
believed that leprosy was very contagious, we isolated persons with leprosy from society 
by sending them to “lepers’ colonies” on remote islands or in special hospitals.258
Similarly, the driving privileges of individuals with epilepsy are restricted when their 
epilepsy is not controlled.259
________________________________________________________________________
256 See, e.g., Elyn R. Saks, REFUSING CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF THE 
MENTALLY ILL (2002); Robert F. Schopp, COMPETENCE, CONDEMNATION, AND COMMITMENT: AN 
INTEGRATED THEORY OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW (2001).
257 M. Rose Gasner et al., The Use of Legal Action in New York City To Ensure Treatment of
Tuberculosis 340 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 359–66 (1999).
258 http://rarediseases.about.com/cs/infectiousdisease/a/071203.htm, visited August 25, 2004
259 See, e.g., Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal.App.3d 528, 97 Cal.Rptr. 739 (1972).
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In connection with civil commitment, some would restrict the use of the term 
‘dangerous’ to the level of dangerousness required for inpatient commitment. Were that 
perspective correct, assisted treatment could rarely be justified on the basis of 
dangerousness, because few individuals who are that dangerous are safe enough to be 
treated in the community. A more thoughtful approach, however, analyzes ‘dangerous’ as 
relative to context. Dangerous is defined as a level of risk that is worth reducing a 
particular amount in light of the cost of less risky alternatives. 260 Consider an individual 
who is not so dangerous as to meet the test for dangerousness required for inpatient 
commitment. Still, that individual might create a significant risk of injury to others. If the 
cost of placing that individual on outpatient commitment—conceived broadly—is less 
than the value of the reduction in risk that would be expected to result from that 
placement, then the individual meets the less stringent test of dangerousness for 
outpatient commitment. We conclude that an appropriate level of dangerousness to others
will support coercion for assisted treatment.
Philosophers, mental health law scholars, and courts all agree that individuals 
who are incapacitated in the relevant area—whether it be mental health treatment 
decision making or handling finances—are justifiably subject to paternalistic 
intervention.261 Some would say that such persons, because they lack the relevant 
capacity, are not autonomous, and therefore have no relevant rights. A more respectful 
description is that because they are unable to capably act on their own behalf, the state is 
________________________________________________________________________
260 Robert F. Schopp, Outpatient Civil Commitment: A Dangerous Charade or a Component of a 
Comprehensive Institution of Civil Commitment?, 9 PSYCHOLOGY, PUB. POL’Y & L. 33 (2003). 
261 KRESS, AN ARGUMENT FOR ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT 1269, 1314–15 (2000).
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permitted, and perhaps morally obligated, to act in these individuals’ interests or to 
delegate that task to others.262
Some would urge that paternalistic intervention is justified only if the 
incapacitated individual receives a benefit. For example, in commitment they must 
receive beneficial treatment,263 but not just any beneficial treatment will do. To take an 
extreme example, taping the broken toe of a manic patient to reduce pain, and therefore 
minimally reduce stress and mania, will not suffice as beneficial treatment. On the other 
hand, providing that treatment that has the best combination of excellent prospects for 
minimizing the illness while avoiding side effects is a beneficial treatment. There remains 
room for disagreement over intermediate cases. Is a well intended, but poorly thought 
out, treatment plan beneficial treatment? Can massage and reflexology therapy be 
beneficial treatment? The question of what is beneficial treatment that could justify 
paternalistic intervention deserves more extensive discussion than it has received in the 
literature. We will say more about it in a moment. For now, we will simply note that most 
think that massage mostly provides temporary relief from stress and is therefore a mere 
interest of the patient. This may explain why many have doubts that massage can be a 
beneficial treatment. It also explains why patients who believe that massage reduces 
stress and therefore treats mania on a long-term basis believe that it is a beneficial 
treatment. By contrast, treatment with excellent prospects for maximizing mental health 
is clearly a beneficial treatment because it maximizes the basic good of mental health, 
which is itself instrumental to autonomy and ordinary, non-basic goods in the future.
________________________________________________________________________
262 KRESS, AN ARGUMENT FOR ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT 1269, 1314–15 (2000).
263 BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT; Bruce J. Winick, 
Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental Illness, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L., 534, 
587 (1995).
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Most rights theorists contend that only when a person is incapacitated in the sense 
of not being autonomous is paternalistic intervention defensible. Dangerousness and lack 
of autonomy, however, will not support all cases of assisted treatment. For example, 
some outpatient commitment laws, such as Kendra’s Law264 and Laura’s Law,265 do not 
require total incapacity. Nor do most payeeship relationships. Might coercion in these 
circumstances nevertheless be justifiable? Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we shall 
urge that there are circumstances in which partial, but not complete, impairment will 
justify paternalistic intervention. But we must first take a small detour into the 
justification for the conventional wisdom before exploring our disagreement with it.
Deontological, or rights-based, theories receive powerful support from certain 
counterintuitive results that appear to flow from consequentialist theories. 
Consequentialist theories, a generalization of utilitarianism, maintain that the morally 
preferred action is that one that will maximize the amount of good, or things of value.
Such theories have been critiqued from the perspective of rights theorists, 
including advocates of strong autonomy rights, by hypotheticals such as the following. It 
would appear that if five friends of Smith want to use his car to go to a great party, and he 
is going to use the car to drive one block to the corner store for milk, then it maximizes 
the good (utility, preference satisfaction, what have you) for his friends to take Smith’s 
car to the party. It therefore seems that consequentialism requires Smith to let them use 
the car; he should walk to the store.266 But our intuitions about what it means to own the 
car include his right to loan the car or not at his whim. This is not to say that Smith 
________________________________________________________________________
264 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. Sec. 9.60 (c) (4)&(5) (2003).
265 A.B. 1421 (CA 2003).
266 Assume that for some reason the obvious solution, namely, that Smith picks up the milk and then
relinquishes the car, is not available. Perhaps the car must be picked up to go to the party before the store 
opens.
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cannot be criticized as selfish, a character flaw. Rather, we are merely asserting that it is 
morally permissible for Smith to exercise his right.
A more familiar form of this example states that we should not cut up one 
individual, distributing his kidneys, lungs, and heart to five hopeful organ recipients, at a 
net gain of four lives. Rather, his right to life trumps the net gain in lives.
Rights theorists therefore urge that we may not violate rights, especially 
autonomy rights for the sake of well-being, or even other rights. This has been thought to 
apply even to an individual’s own rights: I may not take your car without your 
permission, even in certain pursuit of two better cars, which I give to you. A 
consequentialism of rights, so to speak, is not permissible. One principle that rights 
theorists frequently promote is that we cannot violate A’s right for the sake of B’s right or 
interest. We have just seen that a second such principle has been advocated: one may not 
violate A’s right for the sake of a greater amount of rights or goods for A. But we believe 
that there is an exception to this principle when the individual partially or completely 
lacks certain capacities, as the following examples demonstrate.
We take keys away from friends of ours who are drunk and intend to drive. Some 
cases involve individuals who are dangerous to others. Other cases involve individuals 
who are completely incapacitated. However, there will be some circumstances in which 
the driver is only partly incapacitated and risks injury only to himself, perhaps because 
the route that he will take involves only his own private property. Even in these cases, we 
paternalistically intervene.
We will now describe cases that involve mostly dangerousness to self and that can 
be described so as to involve only dangerousness to self. We prevent children from 
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playing on the highway. We prevent children and delusional persons from jumping from 
tall buildings in the belief that they can fly. We prevent people from committing suicide 
without stopping to determine if they are even partially incapacitated. These cases may be 
described as preventing injury to self, although the highway example might be better 
described as putting oneself in a situation creating a great likelihood of being injured by 
others. At times, we draft people into the military. Although these individuals may not be 
dangerous to others, a public safety rationale exists since they are trained to support an 
effort to reduce risks to the public. On the other hand, of course, the draft often increases 
risks to the drafted individual.
Examples best described as coercing people in order to improve their health, a 
basic good, include forcing children to take their medicine and enforcing advance 
directives when the current self objects and is legally incompetent. Notice that basic 
goods, like health and mental health, are instrumental for many—if not most—
autonomous activities, and many interests or ordinary goods. A third class of cases does 
not require dangerousness by or to the coerced individual. For example, we coerce 
children and teenagers into attending school in order to have greater capacities for action 
and abilities to participate in public governance after attainment of majority. Coercion 
appears justified here in order to create greater autonomous abilities in the future. We are 
less comfortable coercing children or others into playing the trumpet, so as to receive 
pleasure or have one more ability in the future, by contrast to forcing individuals to 
accept treatment or obtain a basic education.
These examples provide evidence that we are justified in coercing individuals 
even when they are partially autonomous and not completely lacking in autonomy or 
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totally incapacitated. Three general principles appear to be applicable here, although 
these should be taken as guidelines with the expectation of occasional counterexamples. 
First, the more dangerous an individual is, the more justified are coercive restraints. 
Second, the less capable an individual is, the more comfortable we are with paternalistic 
intervention. Third, the greater the benefit that the individual is likely to receive, the more 
justified we are in infringing on her liberty. In considering benefits, restricting liberty is 
best justified by greater autonomy in the future. Secondarily, restricting liberty is, at the 
next level, best justified by increasing basic goods, like mental health, that are 
instrumental to most autonomous activities and non-basic goods. Finally, we consider 
ordinary goods and interests in determining the magnitude of the benefit that an 
individual receives.
We will now apply these principles to assisted treatment. Providing treatment to 
individuals who would be dangerous in the community without assisted treatment, but are 
likely not to be dangerous with assisted treatment, is justified. Whether providing assisted 
treatment to a dangerous individual that probably would reduce the risk that the 
individual would injure others but not to the point of not being dangerous is justified 
depends on the facts of individual cases. Individuals who are incapacitated in the relevant 
respect may be provided with assisted treatment if they are likely to benefit from it. The 
greater the benefit they are likely to receive, the more comfortable we are about 
intervening on their behalf. Finally, when an individual is partially incapacitated, whether 




We conclude with some broader remarks about the proper interpretation of the 
Constitution, what statutes in this area should look like, and some broad policy 
implications that follow from our examination of anosognosia. 
Most scholars interpret the United States Constitution and the Constitutional 
cases of the Supreme Court as requiring both mental illness and dangerousness for 
commitment. In fact, the above argument demonstrates that dangerousness is not required 
by the Constitution because incapacity suffices, and, moreover, mere impairment suffices 
under appropriate circumstances.
 Additionally, Supreme Court doctrine, especially Foucha v. Louisiana, does not 
require dangerousness, despite widespread belief to the contrary. In Foucha v. 
Louisiana,267 language in the plurality opinion asserts that the Constitution requires both 
mental illness and dangerousness, but the Court's statements about dangerousness are 
both dicta and based upon a misunderstanding of the Court's prior opinions in Jones v. 
United States,268 and O'Connor v. Donaldson.269 Whether substantive due process 
requires dangerousness was not before the Court. Moreover, as Justice Thomas noted in 
his dissent, Jones held that mental illness and dangerousness was constitutionally 
sufficient for commitment, whereas the plurality of the Court misstated Jones as holding 
that mental illness and dangerousness were necessary for a commitment that is 
constitutional.270 More importantly, the plurality had only four votes. Justice O'Connor 
made it clear that her fifth and deciding vote was premised upon the opinion applying 
only to Louisiana's criminal commitment statute, and does not apply to other more 
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narrowly drawn criminal commitment statutes. A fortiori, the opinion does not apply to 
civil commitment statutes: "I write separately, however, to emphasize that the Court's 
opinion addresses only the specific statutory scheme before us, which broadly permits 
indefinite confinement of sane insanity acquittees in psychiatric facilities."271
Moreover, Justice O'Connor reiterated that Jones had noted that psychiatry is an 
inexact science, and that for that reason, "'courts should pay particular deference to 
reasonable legislative judgments' about the relationship between dangerous behavior and 
mental illness."272
Those scholars who do not believe dangerousness is required under the 
Constitution believe that either dangerousness or incapacity is required.
In our view, what the Constitution requires is a need for treatment and either some 
degree of enhanced risk or some degree of impairment and a benefit/treatment reasonably 
designed to satisfy the need for treatment, that is, likely to alleviate the degree of 
dangerousness or impairment that justifies the particular commitment. The commitment 
and treatment may be continued past the point at which that particular patient no longer 
meets the Constitutional minimum required to trigger commitment if the treatment is 
likely to reap substantial gains in stabilizing the illness without being an undue hardship 
on the patient.
Various forms of outpatient commitment that require less intrusive treatment 
constitutionally require correspondingly lesser degrees of dangerousness/risk and 
impairment, and will generally necessitate lesser amounts of benefit/treatment.
________________________________________________________________________
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F. Statutes
At a minimum, statutes must meet the strictures of the Constitution. Thus, 
inpatient commitment will require an appropriate level of dangerousness or impairment 
or both. But to the extent that funds permit, states should be encouraged to provide more 
than the minimum required treatment. Statutes should explicitly state that tests for lack of 
insight are evidence of degrees of impairment.
Once again, outpatient treatment should involve a sliding scale of prerequisites 
corresponding to the degree of intervention. Moreover, there should be a sliding scale of 
treatments depending upon the type and severity of the illness that gives rise to the 
justification for the variety of outpatient commitment. 
G. Policy
As has been implicit in discussion of outpatient commitment, the recent 
emergence of various forms of mandatory community treatment should be encouraged 
and extended. The forms of treatment should not merely be a continuum of severity of 
illness, but, more subtly, should take into account different illnesses, different ways of 
being ill within the same illness, and different levels of intervention. The forms of 
treatment are best thought of as a subset of a continuum of continua. 
Moreover, the law should find ways to intervene other than bipolar on-off 
interventions: either you are committed, or else you are not committed. By contrast, 
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social interactions both permit and require gradually greater interventions before applying 
for commitment is justified.
Our social conventions dictate that, in general, informal mechanisms to minimize 
or prevent dangerous behavior—including, dangerousness to self—be attempted prior to 
applying for commitment, guardianship, or coerced medication.273  For example, if we 
encounter a stranger who appears to be a deteriorating or psychotic consumer, we might 
ignore him.  Particularly if she appears to be engaged in self destructive or dangerous 
behavior, we may first attempt to point out the potential negative consequences of her 
behavior.  If she is not persuaded to alter her behavior, we may engage in more detailed 
or aggressive argument, including an attempt to show that her behavior is inconsistent 
with nearly universal community values, or that it is illegal or immoral.  We might see if 
we could help her to get treatment.  We might attempt to persuade or argue that she 
would benefit from treatment, or should at least try it.  But unless she meets the criteria 
for civil commitment, and even then, we are unlikely to do more.  
However, if a consumer is a friend, then, under the same circumstances, we might 
well do more.  First, we might be more aggressive in our attempts at persuasion or 
argument. We might attempt to show that his behavior is not merely inconsistent with 
nearly universal community values, but also with values he holds dear, to provide a more 
potent reason for him to take risk-reducing steps. We might think that we have a duty to 
attempt to persuade our friend into treatment, or at least to consider the options 
thoughtfully. If unsuccessful, we might resort to cajoling him, or even attempt 
manipulation, particularly if he is a close friend.  Second, if unsuccessful on this 
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 Indeed, even in litigation courts frequently require settlement conferences and often pressure or even 
coerce litigants into settling.  
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occasion, we might later check in with our friend to see how he is doing.  On some of 
these occasions, we might again attempt to persuade him to obtain treatment, or marshal 
its virtues.  If unsuccessful, we might resort to cajoling him, or even attempt 
manipulation.  If still unsuccessful, and if the risk is sufficiently serious, we might inform 
persons closer to him of our concerns, or at least determine if they are aware of the 
situation.  We might call a closer friend, partner, spouse, sibling, parent, child, or 
employer with the hope that they will have more success in influencing him. If they are 
not aware, we will disclose our concerns and encourage them to act, especially because 
they have more influence and informal, social authority over him. Relatives will be even 
more likely to view themselves as having an obligation to help in an appropriate way. 
Whether stimulated by another's concern, or based upon their own observations as a close 
friend or relative, if talk is ineffective, they might bring him to the hospital by subterfuge, 
or with mild coercion or force.  Unless immediate action is indicated, they may 
substantially or completely exhaust informal influence and control mechanisms before 
initiating formal legal intervention such as commitment or guardianship proceedings.  
Indeed, as a society, we frequently view premature initiation of legal proceedings as 
antitherapeutic,274 just as courts are rightly suspicious of premature lawsuits.  
Depending upon the circumstances, we may be more interventionist. Given the 
irreversibility of jumping from a tall building, and the exigency when someone is poised 
to jump, we may use force to restrain a potential jumper prior to launching an inquiry into 
her disability or incapacity, if any.  Sometimes when we are uncertain if intervention is 
socially or morally justified, we may intervene yet be prepared to back off if new 
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evidence or consequences warrant.  This scenario is more likely when the negative 
consequences of inaction are of great magnitude.275
When premature, resort to legal process may reflect poorly on friends, colleagues, 
and family.  By the same token, failure to be adequately responsive to informal 
mechanisms may provide justification for inquiry respecting potential disability, or even 
modest but rebuttable evidence of disability itself. 
A good lawyer or advocate for commitment or coerced treatment would be well 
advised to present evidence of inappropriate responses to informal interventions as part of 
the case for formal intervention.  Conversely, advocates for a respondent or a defendant 
should explore inappropriate informal interventions, or failure to attempt informal 
methods prior to initiating legal action.  For example, if a merchant who is overcharged 
by his supplier fails to communicate with the supplier in order to resolve the discrepancy, 
and instead, sues, the court will be justified in castigating the merchant for prematurely 
bringing suit, and probably wasting scarce court resources.  
 However, failure to respond does not always justify inferences to possible 
significant disabilities.  When the same issue has been discussed on forty prior occasions, 
and family members are entrenched in opposed positions, an aggressive attempt to revisit 
the issue may justify a dismissive response such as “Get out of my face,” which would be 
disrespectful if uttered on the occasion of a first, polite inquiry or invitation to discuss the 
issue.  Similarly, failure to change one’s behavior is not unresponsive in this context if 
the individual provides some socially appropriate explanation or reason why he or she 
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does not accept the recommended change in behavior.  And the notion of explanation or 
reason cannot be stricter than that deployed in understanding and justifying the behavior 
of the “chronically mentally healthy” adult population in similar circumstances and 
ordinary conversation, on pain of treating consumers unequally and disrespectfully, 
probably in consequence of stigma. 
We have seen that the law intervenes in various degrees from payeeship to 
conservatorship to conditional release to outpatient commitment to guardianship to 
inpatient commitment. The law would do well to follow social conventions in creating
yet more mechanisms for gradually working up to a commitment by small steps. 
VII. Conclusion
In 1690, John Locke, in Two Treatises of Government, recommended government 
protection for “Madmen, which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right
Reason to guide themselves.” For Locke, this application of parens patriae was “no more 
than Duty, which God and nature has laid on Man.”276
Since the 1960s, state mental health laws have moved away from parens patriae 
as a basis for state action and moved toward the use of dangerousness as the exclusive 
grounds for state intervention. This move has often been justified by claiming that it 
supports the civil rights and liberty of the persons. As Frank Lanterman, one of the 
sponsors of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act phrased it: The proposed legislation would 
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free “thousands of persons from the ‘tyranny of help’ that has camouflaged for so many 
years the denial of liberty and basic human dignity.”277
This represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the concept of liberty 
and the goal of treating all individuals with severe psychiatric disorders with the 
least restrictive alternative. As Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy recently 
noted:
It must be remembered that for the person with severe mental illness who 
has no treatment, the most dreaded of confinements can be the 
imprisonment inflicted by his own mind, which shuts reality out and 
subjects him to the torment of voices and images beyond our powers to 
describe.278
Robert Reich observed that “freedom to be sick, helpless and isolated is 
not freedom,”279 and Stephen Rachlin et al. similarly asked: “Can we really call it 
‘liberty’ if someone walks the streets in terror because of paranoid delusions or 
threatening hallucinations?”280
For individuals with severe psychiatric disorders, the consequences of 
nontreatment can be severe. Homelessness, incarceration, and victimization are 
often the daily fare. In commenting on the effects of the Lessard decision on 
affected individuals, Darold Treffert put it succinctly and eloquently:
It is not “freedom” to be wandering the streets, severely mentally ill, 
deteriorating and getting warmth from a steam grate or food from a 
garbage can; that’s abandonment. And it is not “liberty” to be in a padded 
________________________________________________________________________
277 LANTERMAN, NEW MENTAL HEALTH LEGISLATION.
278 Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 609–610, 119 S.Ct. 21762191 (1999) (Justice Kennedy, 
concurring in the judgment).
279 Robert Reich, Care of the Chronically Mentally Ill—A National Disgrace, 130 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 911–12 (1973).
280 Stephen Rachlin et al., Civil Liberties versus Involuntary Hospitalization, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
189–91 (1975).
107
jail cell instead of a hospital, hallucinating and delusional, without 
treatment because that is all the law will allow.281
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